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Children’s confidence in their own knowledge and their understanding of other’s 
intentions may influence their willingness to learn novel information from others. Two 
studies investigated whether 24-month-old children take into account these different 
sources of information when learning novel labels. In Study 1, children interacted with a 
speaker who referred to familiar objects in either a knowledgeable (e.g., the speaker 
confidently stated, “I know what that is”) or an ignorant manner (e.g., the speaker 
doubtfully stated, “I don’t know what that is.”). The previously knowledgeable or 
ignorant speaker then provided a novel label for either a novel or a familiar object. 
Children were less willing to apply a novel label to a familiar object from a speaker who 
previously had expressed ignorance than one who previously had expressed confidence in 
his/her knowledge of object labels. In contrast, when objects were novel, children were 
equally willing to learn a novel label regardless of the level of knowledge portrayed by 
the speaker.  
 vii 
In Study 2, children interacted with a speaker who provided either accurate or 
inaccurate labels for familiar objects in a manner that expressed uncertainty about the 
information being offered (e.g., “I think that’s a …”). Children’s willingness to accept 
second labels for familiar objects was examined. Children were equally likely to learn the 
novel label for a familiar object from the accurate and the inaccurate speaker. In contrast 
to past findings which present differences in willingness to learn from accurate and 
inaccurate speakers, children in this study may have taken into account the speaker’s lack 
of confidence when deciding whether to accept or reject the novel information being 
provided.  
Young children are not naïve observers accepting novel label information from 
any source. They attend to cues about the speaker’s level of knowledge by 24 months. 
They also are capable of comparing their knowledge with the information being 
presented by an adult speaker and deciding whether to rely on their own knowledge or 
accept the information being provided. Both reliability cues from the speaker and 
children’s prior knowledge influence their willingness to learn novel information.  
 viii 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
A woman is walking through downtown New York City, lost. She turns to a 
stranger walking by and asks, “Can you tell me where Park Avenue is?” The stranger 
points to the left and responds, “About 4 blocks that way. You can’t miss it.” She thanks 
the stranger and heads in the direction he pointed. While an unremarkable event for 
anyone who has ever been to New York City, this interaction between two adults 
illustrates many of the assumptions that may aid children during early word learning. The 
stranger understands that the woman not only wants to know if he “can” tell her the 
direction of Park Avenue, but that he will actually provide the information she is trying to 
attain. The woman assumes that the stranger will provide her with accurate information 
and may also have the assumption that if the stranger does not know where Park Avenue 
is, he will be upfront about that as well.  
While this example, at first glance, does not appear to mimic the daily interactions 
between adults and children, it is possible to see how the assumptions children make 
early in development continue throughout the lifespan. One assumption that has been 
made about children’s word learning is that children believe that adults will provide 
accurate information. During early word learning, children’s vocabularies are expanding 
at an exponential rate. A two-year-old child learns about 5 words a day on average. With 
all of the input from the environment children are receiving, it seems logical that they are 
monitoring the sources of new information for reliability. But how is it possible that 
children are able to keep track of the large amount of information, both linguistic and 
nonlinguistic, that is present in their environment and use it to their advantage?  
This paper will focus on how multiple accounts for early learning may be 
interrelated with respect to understanding how children interpret the type of knowledge 
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that a speaker has when learning novel information.  By examining speaker reliability, it 
is possible to study the influence that a speaker’s level of information or knowledge has 
on children’s subsequent behavior. Before moving to how children may develop the 
understanding that speakers generally provide accurate descriptions of the environment, I 
will present questions that will guide the scope of this dissertation: 
1. Does the ability to understand speaker knowledge as an indicator of the 
credibility of the information source develop from infant’s early 
understanding of referential cues?  
2. At what age do children take into account that a speaker may have 
different states of knowledge (i.e., knowledgeable, ignorant, or unreliable) 
when determining whether to learn novel information?  
3. What insight into speaker reliability can be provided by contradicting the 
knowledge of the child with novel information provided by a speaker, as 
in the situation in which a speaker provides a novel label for a familiar 
object? 
Children may use their knowledge about an object to determine whether a speaker 
is a reliable source of novel information. In situations in which the speaker is unreliable, 
such as the case that a speaker lacks knowledge about the object or is uncertain about the 
object’s label, children instead may rely on information they have learned from other, 
more reliable sources. When determining whether a source is credible, children may 
attend to referential cues that are available from speaker, such as eye gaze, tone of voice, 
and facial expressions, as well as the verbal phrases provided by the speaker that indicate 
the level of knowledge the speaker can provide. If these cues to a speaker’s reliability 
indicate that the speaker is a credible source of information, children may be more 
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willing to learn novel information. In contrast, if the speaker is not credible, children may 
disregard the novel information and rely on their own prior knowledge, if available.  
This dissertation is divided into five sections to address the issues presented 
above: Nonverbal Intent Cues, Referential Intent Cues and Word Learning, Speaker 
Reliability, Theory of Mind, and Second Label Learning. Each section provides an 
overview of the literature within the field that relates to children’s understanding of 
referential intent. This dissertation begins with a discussion of young children’s basic 
understanding that adults offer social-pragmatic cues to provide information about the 
purpose of their behavior. After reviewing evidence that children may exploit referential 
cues from their environment to aid in word learning, the topic of children’s use of speaker 
reliability as an influence on novel label learning will be introduced. There have been a 
growing number of studies that examine the role of speaker accuracy on young children’s 
word learning. The influence of speaker knowledge on children’s willingness to apply 
novel labels may be associated with children’s ability to determine the goals or intentions 
of the speaker. Consequently, I will discuss the relationship between Theory of Mind 
development and children’s early understanding of intentional acts, as well as how 
Theory of Mind tasks may relate to language development. Children may rely on adults 
to provide accurate information about unfamiliar objects as an aid during novel word 
learning. 
This paper will also examine the differences between speaker reliability, which is 
typically discussed in terms of accurate and inaccurate labeling, and ignorance, which 
includes situations in which a speaker lacks knowledge. These areas present different 
states of knowledge that children may encounter early in word learning. Finally, this 
review will conclude with a discussion of second label learning, which provides an 
opportunity to investigate children’s willingness to learn novel names for objects that are 
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familiar to them. When children are learning a novel label for a novel object, they may be 
more accepting of information provided by outside sources due to their lack of 
experience or knowledge about the object being labeled. During second label learning, 
children have the option either of accepting or rejecting a novel label for a familiar object 
because they already have a label that applies to that object. This section of the 
dissertation includes a detailed review of Mutual Exclusivity, a word learning assumption 
that has been proposed to help children narrow down the number of possible meanings 
for a referent (Markman, 1990). This dissertation will propose that by investigating 
constraints on word learning and their relationship to referential cues, such as speaker 
reliability, a better understanding of children’s willingness to learn novel labels as well as 
their expectations for adult labelers will be attained.  
Children benefit from the understanding that individuals have their own mental 
states and that referential intent cues provide information about the mental states 
associated with communication goals. Three- to four-year-old children’s decisions about 
whether to accept information may be based upon several characteristics of the speaker(s) 
such as age, reliability, level of knowledge, and even the number of people who agree 
with the information provided (Birch, 2005; Birch & Bloom, 2007;Corriveau, Fusaro, & 
Harris, 2009; Jaswal, 2004; Jaswal & Malone, 2007; Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Koenig, 
Clément, & Harris, 2004; Koenig & Harris, 2005). The purpose of the research reported 
here is to investigate how prior knowledge and referential intent interact to influence 
children’s willingness to accept a novel label.  
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Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
NONVERBAL INTENT CUES 
In order to discuss children’s understanding of intentionality, it is important to 
understand what that term refers to in the greater context. A person’s intentions include 
goals and reasons for acting a certain way, and can be very public knowledge, as they can 
be expressed in eye gaze, body movement, tone of voice, language, and many other social 
cues that impart knowledge about one person to another. Many of the cues available are 
in nonverbal contexts that provide information beyond what is present in the speech 
input.  
As adults, we seem to integrate these social cues into our conversations 
unconsciously (e.g., when talking about a person located on the other side of the room 
with a person standing close by, one’s eye gaze may shift automatically towards the 
person being referred to) and we receive and process these cues without much effort (e.g., 
the other person in the conversation now follows the speaker’s gaze and, in turn, looks 
toward the person being referred to). This referential nature of intention allows 
clarification of subject matter and helps provide clues, other than what is available in 
speech, towards the message the speaker is attempting to communicate. This section will 
focus on when children begin to attend to referential cues that are available from other 
speakers and later will explore the concept that children expect adults to be accurate 
sources of information about both familiar and novel objects. Children may have the 
expectation that the information that an adult provides should move both participants 
closer to achieving the purpose of the interaction; therefore, the information should be 
accurate and reliable (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007). Participants require a basic 
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understanding of the intentions of the other participants to determine whether they are 
reliable sources of information.  
In order to understand how referential cues help children during word learning, it 
must be established how children’s understanding of intention develops. Tomasello, 
Carpenter, Call, Behne, and Moll (2004) discuss the emergence of intentionality in young 
infants as an important facet in the development of social understanding. By about 12 to 
14 months of age, children are able to participate in activities that require joint attention: 
that is, both the child and the adult are constructing a common goal, or an understanding 
of engaging in a shared task, that they will work together to accomplish. By creating a 
purpose to their interaction, both the child and the adult also create expectations about the 
role that each participant plays in order to attain this goal. Tomasello et al. state that both 
the adult and child “establish mutually supportive roles by coordinating and sometimes 
even planning what each will do as they act together toward a common end, attending to 
things jointly as they do” (p. 15). Children, at this age, may assume that adults will 
provide quantitatively more information about how to achieve the goal because adults 
have more knowledge. If an adult does not help achieve the goal, children must determine 
the most appropriate response to the adult’s behavior, which may require relying on their 
own knowledge, if available.   
One perspective on children’s understanding of referential cues is gained by 
violating their expectations of what should be referred to during an interaction. Children 
may develop certain beliefs or expectations of how others should act or respond and, on 
this basis, predict behavior that coincides with these expectations. When an adult behaves 
in a manner that does not correspond with the child’s prediction, the child must reconcile 
this violation by either forming a new prediction or accounting for the behavior in some 
other manner (as in, he meant to place the pen on the table, not to have it roll onto the 
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floor). A child’s world is not one in which random acts are occurring all of the time; they 
are capable of organizing information in a meaningful manner. One area of research has 
focused on children’s ability to determine the goals of others, mainly focusing on what 
cues children attend to when determining a person’s intentions for performing an action.  
Young children seem to have an understanding that humans, but not inanimate 
objects, are capable of acts that involve intention. Meltzoff (1995) examined whether 18-
month-old children would recognize that failed actions done by an adult human had an 
intended result that was not completed. Participants watched as either a human 
experimenter or a mechanical device attempted 5 different actions but failed to complete 
the target act. Children were then tested to see if they would complete the target act that 
the actor had intended to do, or if they would model the failed actions. Children were six 
times more likely to produce the intended target act after watching a human perform the 
failed act than after viewing the mechanical device. Meltzoff concluded that children, and 
adults, do not assign intentional responsibility to inanimate things, as in we do not claim 
that our computers meant to delete all of the work we had written before it crashed, but 
that instead inanimate beings are doing what they are programmed to do by laws such as 
physics. Humans, on the other hand, may have specific reasons for actions, or intentions, 
that direct the goal of the behaviors being presented. Meltzoff suggested that infants as 
young as 18 months can understand simple goal directed behavior: “Infants’ 
understanding of intention in action would allow them to make sense of what would 
otherwise be rather odd behavior on the part of the adult” (p. 847). Children are using 
their ability to understand the goals of other intentional beings to organize and 
successfully predict the intended actions of others.  
When interacting with others, children attend to social cues being provided to 
guide their understanding of the interaction. Sodian and Thoermer (2004) examined how 
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12-month-old infants understand the referential cues of gazing and pointing. Using a 
habituation paradigm, the authors found that infants would use the experimenter’s eye 
gaze and reaching behavior to predict later behavior. Results also indicated that 12-
month-old infants had difficulty interpreting pointing cues as being referential. A study 
by Desroshers, Morissette, and Ricard (1995) found that 15-month-old infants had a 
greater understanding of the referential nature of the pointing gesture than 12-month-old 
infants. The older infants in this study often produced the pointing gesture accompanied 
with a change in eye gaze towards their mothers with the goal of directing attention 
towards an object. Children’s attention towards social cues that are salient in their 
environment, such as eye gaze, may develop earlier than symbolic referential cues, such 
as pointing. 
Eye gaze is a referential cue that young children are able to perceive at a 
relatively early age and it may be one of the earliest cues to the reliability of the person 
with whom they are interacting. Chow, Poulin-Dubois and Lewis (2008) investigated 
whether 14-month-old children were sensitive to the reliability of an adult’s looking 
behavior. Children were given a familiarization period in which an experimenter 
established reliability by either looking for a toy inside a container, finding it and 
expressing positive affect (reliable looker) or looking in a container, not finding a toy and 
expressing positive affect (unreliable looker). People do not typically expresses happiness 
upon finding an empty box, so children should view the unreliable labeler’s positive 
affect as a violation of expectations. During test trials, a target object was placed either in 
front of a barrier in plain sight of the children or hidden behind a barrier, blocked from 
the children’s view. Children’s willingness to follow the eye gaze of the experimenter 
towards the target object was measured. Children in the reliable looker condition were 
willing to follow the eye gaze of the experimenter whether the target object was visible to 
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them or hidden from them. Children in the unreliable looker condition were willing to 
follow the gaze of the experimenter only when the target object was visible to them, but 
not when the target object was blocked from their view. Young children are more willing 
to rely on an adult who has provided referential cues that are consistent with their 
expectations, and are less likely to trust information presented by an unreliable adult. 
One question that remains is whether children will project their predictions of 
behavior onto people with whom they have no prior experience. A follow-up study was 
conducted to clarify whether children were making a decision about the reliability of an 
experimenter or if the continued access to an unreliable looker only extinguished the 
response pattern to look (i.e., children learned that there is no positive result associated 
with following the gaze of the unreliable looker and so they discontinued that behavioral 
response during the test trials). In the second study, children interacted with an unreliable 
looker during the familiarization trial but during the test trial they interacted with a naïve 
looker (i.e., a second experimenter who had not established reliability). Chow et al. 
(2008) concluded that young infants treated a looker who had established a reliable gaze 
as equally reliable to a naïve looker who had not established either reliable or unreliable 
looking behavior. The unreliability of the previous experimenter did not influence the 
children’s trust in an unfamiliar experimenter. The authors conclude that 14-month-olds 
“treat an unfamiliar adult as reliable by default, unless their expectation in violated” (p. 
19). This result provides evidence that children are creating assumptions about the 
reliability of adults at a very early age and are using social cues provided by adults to 
predict future behavior.  
Children are able to attend to nonverbal social cues, such as eye gaze and 
pointing, before their second birthdays. They are also able to make judgments about the 
future behavior of the person they are interacting with based upon the reliability of the 
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referential information being provided by that person. This early attunement into the 
referential nature of social cues helps children attend to relevant stimuli in their 
environment and allows them to have successful interactions with others, within which 
mutual goals can be created and attained. One area of development that has closely 
examined the relationship between children’s ability to attend to social cues and the 
referential nature of the cues being provided is in regard to early language development.  
REFERENTIAL INTENT CUES AND WORD LEARNING 
As children distinguish between multiple possibilities to identify the meaning of a 
new word, they likely rely both on their preexisting abilities to organize information 
about labels and referents and on cues that are available from an adult speaker. As adults 
provide information in labeling contexts, children have to decide whether the information 
is both relevant and referential. This is a complex process that requires children to 
understand the relationship of a label to its intended referent as well as the referential 
nature of adult labeling. Large bodies of research suggest that biases guide word learning 
(Au & Glusman, 1990; Clark, 1997; Markman, 1990; Mervis, Golinkoff, & Bertrand, 
1994) and that social context may influence how children assign labels to referents 
(Baldwin, 1993; Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001; Sabbagh, Wdowiak, & Ottaway, 2003), but 
less is known about how the two interact.   
It could be that children have the expectation that adults will provide accurate 
information that complies with the general consensus, meaning that when an adult calls a 
strange looking animal with 4 legs and a tail a “dog” that this is also what most other 
adults will call the same animal. Young children are unfamiliar with many, if not most, of 
the objects in their environment; therefore, they cannot rely solely on their own 
knowledge to help them isolate the label for an object. They rely upon others as sources 
of information and apply the novel information to preexisting knowledge that they may 
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have. Through this social scaffolding of information (Pratt, Kerig, Cowan, & Cowan, 
1988; Wood, Bruner, & Ross, 1976), adults provide the framework for which children 
can learn more complex information. As children gain experience in language learning, 
they may become more comfortable with the concept that adults provide reliable 
information. One issue that is important to address before discussing the influence of 
speaker reliability on language learning is how children are able to quickly learn word-
object relationships. 
The age at which children become skilled at learning a novel label has been 
contested within the field of psychology. Research has focused upon the argument over 
whether a “vocabulary spurt” exists around the age of 18 months. Schafer and Plunkett 
(1998) tested infants, ages 12 to 17 months, to determine whether they would be able to 
rapidly learn a novel word before the “vocabulary spurt.” Participants of all ages looked 
longer towards an image that matched a previously associated novel label than when an 
entirely novel label that had not been associated with an image was heard. After only six 
exposures to a novel label, children as young as 12 months have the ability to associate a 
novel image with a novel word.  
Similar results regarding early word learning in infants have been found using real 
objects. Woodward, Markman, and Fitzsimmons (1994) studied whether children, ages 
13 months and 18 months, would learn a novel label for a novel object when the label 
was provided 9 times during joint attention. Woodward et al. found that by 13 months of 
age, children could learn a novel label for a novel object after only a limited amount of 
exposure to the label.  Given that 13 months of age is also before the supposed 
“vocabulary spurt,” it is evident that children have the ability at an early age to rapidly 
learn and apply a novel word to an object for which they do not already have a label. 
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An aspect of early word learning that has been the focus of a large body of 
research and theory is reference uncertainty, which is the concept that a label potentially 
can refer to an infinite number of properties, characteristics, objects, etc. When children 
hear a novel word, they have to determine the referent of the label from the myriad 
potential options that are available within their environment. How is it that children 
decrease reference uncertainty to successfully learn novel labels? Yu, Ballard, and Aslin 
(2005) argue that sensorimotor cues, such as gaze and body movement, help children 
narrow down the large number of possible referents for a label. Their research focuses on 
embodied cognition, which is the attention to sensorimotor cues, such as movement, that 
may aid in knowledge acquisition. The use of embodied cognition allows for more fluent 
processing of both verbal and nonverbal cues, such as those that indicate a speaker’s 
intent. In one study, the authors found that adult participants could more easily recognize 
the referent to a label that was presented in a foreign language, Mandarin Chinese, when 
provided with intention cues from the speaker, than when presented with audio 
information alone, or when presented with audio-visual information with no cues to 
intention (e.g., a video of images from the book of the story being told). Social-pragmatic 
cues may enable language learners to hone in on the meaning of a word. 
Given that children are attending to an adult’s pointing gesture as a referential 
behavior by the age of 15 months (Desrochers et al., 1995), one question is if they are 
able to incorporate both social cues and verbal labeling to determine the referent for an 
object. Baldwin, Markman, Bill, Desjardins, Irwin, and Tidball (1996) tested whether 
children, ages 15 to 20 months, would attend to visual attention cues coinciding with 
labeling behavior when learning a new word. Participants were placed in one of two 
conditions: in the coupled condition, an experimenter produced a novel label for the 
novel toy while interacting with the participant. In the decoupled condition, an 
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experimenter produced a novel label from behind the screen, while another experimenter 
silently interacted with the participant. A third experimenter tested novel label 
comprehension. Baldwin et al. found that 18- to 20-month-old children were successful at 
learning a novel label when the experimenter maintained joint attention while producing 
the label but were unsuccessful at establishing the label-object association in the 
decoupled condition. Children below the age of 18 months did not appear to have 
established the connection between the label and the object in either condition. Children’s 
ability to interpret referential intent cues may aid in early language learning by helping 
children attend to the relevant social cues, though this ability may not be fully developed 
at the beginning of word learning. 
The decoupled condition in Baldwin et al.’s (1996) bears many similarities to the 
situation in which children hear conversations around them that are not directed towards 
them, such as overheard speech. Akhtar, Jipson, and Callanan (2001) examined whether 
2-year-old children were able to associate novel labels with novel objects presented when 
interacting with the speaker or while watching as the speaker interacted with another 
individual. Children were equally likely to apply the novel labels to the appropriate novel 
objects regardless of whether they were directly involved in the labeling interaction or 
they were observing the labeling interaction. These results suggest that children may not 
require joint attention with the speaker when learning novel labels, but children in this 
study were still given the opportunity to observe and attend to the relevant social cues 
provided by the participants of the interaction. A large percentage of speech in children’s 
environment will be of the type that they overhear, so it is important that they are able to 
attend to and make appropriate associations given the speech input available. 
One question is whether children attend to speech as the only relevant input in 
their auditory environment. Do children take into account the social-referential context of 
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the labeling event when learning that verbal labels and nonverbal sounds can apply to a 
novel object? Campbell and Namy (2003) found that 18-month-olds would learn a label 
(i.e., “foppick”) or a nonverbal sound (i.e., a two-tone beep) applied to a novel object 
when it was presented by the experimenter while both the experimenter and the child 
were attending to the same object. They would not, however, learn either the label or the 
nonverbal sound when it was presented through a baby monitor while the child was 
examining the target object with the experimenter present. They found similar results 
with 13-month-olds but the results regarding the 18-month-olds were more consistent and 
robust. The authors conclude that children are attending to the intentionality of the 
labeling event more than to the actual label, and find that children are even willing to 
apply a nonverbal sound as an object label when the referential cues indicate that it is 
appropriate to do so.  
Children often attend to information available from the speaker about the type of 
knowledge the speaker has when learning new information. Birch and Bloom (2002) 
investigated whether children, ages 2 to 4 years, would take into account how familiar the 
experimenter was with an object when applying a proper name. Children interacted with 
an experimenter who indicated that she was familiar with one object (i.e., “I’ve played 
with this dog before”) and unfamiliar with another similar object (i.e., “I’ve never, ever 
seen that dog before”). The two objects were then hidden and children were either asked 
a question that included a proper name (i.e., “Where’s Jesse?”) or a common name (i.e., 
“Where’s the dog?”). Children in all age groups assigned the proper name to the object 
that the experimenter had indicated was familiar. One unexpected finding was that 
younger children tended to give both objects to the experimenter in the common name 
condition. The authors suggest that younger children are including both objects to be sure 
that they have answered the question correctly and note that children did not respond this 
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way when using a proper name, which may indicate that they understand that a proper 
name only applies to a single object. The authors conclude that children’s understanding 
of familiarity is associated with their understanding of the kind of knowledge that others 
may have and that children can use this information to discern intentions. 
Children pay attention to a variety of cues when learning new words, including 
social cues from the speaker supplying a novel label. Social-pragmatic cues, such as eye 
gaze, or statements that reflect the speaker’s knowledge about the environment, can 
provide information about a speaker’s intentions. Research in word learning and social 
cues suggests that children can use such cues from adults to determine the referent of a 
novel label. Can they also use these cues to identify an adult’s knowledge and determine 
whether they should accept novel information from that adult? A growing body of 
research examines how children take into account speaker reliability when making 
decisions of whether to trust or discard specific information provided by an adult. Young 
children’s understanding of their own knowledge and their ability to discern the 
reliability of others’ information are important factors affecting their willingness to 
accept novel information.  
SPEAKER RELIABILITY 
Before discussing the role of speaker reliability in word learning paradigms, it is 
important to clarify the terms that will be used to describe labeling behaviors. An 
accurate labeler is one who consistently provides an appropriate label for a familiar 
object. An inaccurate labeler is one who provides a familiar object with a mismatching or 
inappropriate label, which generally is a different familiar object’s label. Speaker 
reliability is important to early word learning, and may even aid in learning words before 
speech production. Koenig and Echols (2003) examined how 16-month-old children 
responded to intentional cues involving the labeling of familiar objects. Participants saw 
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a series of color slides that displayed familiar objects. Participants either heard the 
accurate label for the object (e.g., “That’s a cat” when the child was viewing a cat) or an 
inaccurate label (e.g., “That’s a shoe” when the child was viewing a cat) across all trials. 
The purpose of providing mismatching familiar labels in the inaccurate labeling condition 
is two-fold: first, the young child should recognize that the label being provided does not 
match the object. Second, the child should also understand that the mismatched label is 
not a second label for the familiar object; it is typically a label that applies to a different 
category of objects. A human speaker who focused visual attention upon the image 
during the trials provided the label. Infants’ eye movements were coded. Infants looked 
longer at the image being displayed when the human speaker correctly labeled the object. 
Infants looked longer at the human speaker and towards the parent when the image was 
incorrectly labeled. This coincides with the prediction that infants expect human speakers 
to truthfully label, and are surprised upon hearing false labels. Upon hearing false labels, 
they may look to the speaker for cues about the speaker’s intentions. Children are using 
their knowledge of referential cues to help determine the goals of the speaker who is 
providing information.  
In order to examine the influence of accurate and inaccurate labeling on children’s 
word learning, one must first understand if children recognize that a difference in the 
labeling behaviors of the speaker exists. Koenig, Clément, and Harris (2004) examined 
whether 3- and 4-year-old children would attend to the labeling behavior of two speakers, 
one who is accurate and one who is inaccurate, before presenting the children with novel 
label learning trials. In this methodology, the children were asked to explicitly indicate 
whether each of the speakers had provided right or wrong information during a 
familiarization period. After providing their judgments, children were presented with 3 
novel label-learning trials with the same two speakers. Each speaker provided a different 
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novel label for the same novel object. Children were then asked which label they would 
use as a referent for the novel object. After the novel label trials, children were again 
asked to judge the overall accuracy of the two speakers.  Koenig et al. found that both 3- 
and 4-year-old children could identify the labeling ability of both the accurate and 
inaccurate speaker. But children who could correctly identify the accurate and the 
inaccurate labeler at both the beginning and the end of the experiment were more likely 
to rely on the information presented by the accurate labeler during the novel label trials. 
Children who made errors when identifying the accurate versus inaccurate labeler during 
the judgment tasks performed below chance levels during the novel label trials. The 
authors conclude that children who are able to identify and retain information about the 
accuracy or reliability of a speaker’s information are more likely to later rely on the 
speaker who provided accurate information.   
Children’s willingness to accept a novel label from a speaker may depend on the 
overall accuracy of the information being provided. Pasquini, Corriveau, Koenig, and 
Harris (2007) found that children as young as 3 years of age were taking into account the 
labeling behavior of a speaker when making decisions as to whether to accept a novel 
label for a novel object. The authors examined whether a speaker had to be 100% 
accurate in order to be considered a reliable source of labeling information. They 
compared the results from children’s label choices for novel objects after a speaker had 
either been 100% accurate or 75% accurate when providing familiar labels to familiar 
objects. Three-year-old children would accept a novel label if the speaker had been 100% 
accurate, but not if the speaker was 75% accurate. Four-year-old children were more 
willing to accept a novel label for a novel object from a speaker who had been 75% 
accurate. The authors propose that 3-year-olds’ performance is based on a binary system 
of trust: either a speaker is reliable or unreliable. If a speaker provides inaccurate 
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information, even if it is only one error, this is enough for the 3-year-olds to disregard 
any future information provided by the speaker. Four-year-olds, on the other hand, may 
keep track of the frequency of errors, instead of a raw score. This allows them to make 
decisions based upon overall accuracy, unlike the 3-year-olds. These results indicate that 
children are monitoring the labeling behavior of the speaker when they have to decide the 
appropriate label for a novel object, but that older children are more successful at 
determining credibility.   
If young children are constantly monitoring their labeling environment for 
predictions about accuracy, this might seem to require a conscious effort on the part of 
the children. However, Pasquini et al. (2007) suggest that young children are using 
statistical learning to determine which speakers are more reliable. Their model would 
have children applying a trustworthiness score of zero to adult labelers, meaning that all 
adult labelers are reliable by default. A score of zero would be consistent with a speaker 
who is 100% accurate when providing labels. The only way to affect this score is 
negatively; if a labeler provides inaccurate information about an object, then his/her 
trustworthiness score will decrease by one error point. The only effect on the reliability of 
a labeler is a negative effect; otherwise, all adult labelers remain the same regardless of 
whether or how much they have proven to be accurate sources of information. The 
authors propose that children’s willingness to learn novel information from a speaker is 
determined by the frequency of errors that the speaker produces. Children keep track of 
the accuracy of the speaker’s information in order to judge their reliability.  
Although the assumption that an adult is a reliable source of information may help 
children organize information more readily, it can also be overcome when other, more 
salient, information is present. Jaswal (2004) found that 4-year-old children were more 
likely than 3-year-old children to reject a label for an out-of-category object that had 
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perceptual features that matched a different label (i.e., a cat-like object being referred to 
as a “dog”). Four-year-old children were more willing to accept the mismatched label for 
the out-of-category object when presented with labeling that explicitly acknowledged the 
mismatch of the label and the perceptual features of the object (i.e., a catlike object is 
referred to with the following phrase: “You’re not going to believe this; but this is 
actually a dog”).  Three-year-old children were willing to accept the mismatched label 
both with and without the explicit acknowledgement of the mismatching. Jaswal 
concludes that children are basing their decisions to accept or reject a label for an object 
by considering the intentionality of the labeler. Four-year-old children are more selective 
in their willingness to override categorical boundaries when accepting a label while 3-
year-old children may rely more heavily on their assumption that adult labelers provide 
accurate information.  
Children may rely on their own knowledge about the world if they have reason to 
doubt the information provided by either an accurate or an inaccurate labeler. Clément, 
Koenig, and Harris (2004) had 3- and 4-year-old children participate in an experiment in 
which their own experience conflicted with the information provided by both accurate 
and inaccurate labelers. Children interacted with 2 puppets, one that provided reliable 
labeling information about familiar objects and one that did not. Children were then 
asked to predict how each puppet would respond when asked about an object the puppets 
could not see. Children were also asked to choose which puppet they would rely on when 
they could not see the object being referred to. Only the older children could correctly 
predict the responses of both the accurate and the inaccurate puppets and correctly 
identify which puppet would provide accurate information about an unknown object. In 
the final task, children were presented an object that they could observe as each puppet 
provided inaccurate information about the object. In this task, even the previously reliable 
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puppet provided information that did not match the observations of the children. When 
the testimony of the accurate and inaccurate labeler conflicted with the first-hand 
observations of both younger and older children, all children were more likely to rely on 
their own observations than the information provided by the accurate and the inaccurate 
labeler.  
Two explanations were provided to explain the age differences discussed in 
Clément et al.’s study. One is that the 3-year-old children are operating with the 
expectation that speakers provide accurate information, while 4-year-old children are 
more likely to attend to and judge the accuracy of the information provided by each 
speaker in order to determine whether they are reliable. The other explanation offered 
relies more heavily on children’s ability to understand the mental states of others. Three-
year-olds typically fail false belief tasks, which require the understanding that a person 
other than oneself can have feelings, thoughts, or beliefs that are incorrect. To 
successfully complete a false belief task, as most 4-year-olds do, one must be able to 
understand that others have beliefs that are based upon their own knowledge that may not 
accurately reflect the world. Children of both ages are able to understand that their first 
hand experiences can provide more reliable information than the testimony of others. 
Children also take into account the type of information available to the speaker 
when determining reliability. A study by Nurmsoo & Robinson (2009) is the only one to 
date that examines 3- to 4-year-old children’s willingness to accept information from 
previously inaccurate speakers using a paradigm in which children interacted with a 
single speaker (i.e., a puppet) throughout the procedure. The speaker provided inaccurate 
information about the properties of objects, but in one condition it was given informed 
access to make a judgment (i.e., the puppet was able to see the object and was asked to 
identify the color), whereas in another condition the puppet was given uninformed access 
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(i.e., the puppet was able to see the object but was asked to identify whether it was hard 
or soft). Children were given informed access to the objects to allow them to make a 
judgment about the reliability of the speaker, who was always inaccurate regardless of the 
type of access granted. Both conditions had identical test trials in which children were 
asked to make a judgment about a new object with uninformed access, whereas the 
puppet had informed access to the object and always provided a judgment that 
contradicted the children’s suggestion. Children could either maintain their original 
suggestion or accept the puppet’s judgment about the property of the object. Children 
who had previously interacted with a puppet that had given inaccurate information after 
having informed access regarding the properties of objects ignored the puppet’s judgment 
and supported their own suggestion. However, children who had interacted with a puppet 
that had uninformed access when providing inaccurate information were more likely to 
support the judgment of the puppet now that it had informed access. This finding 
suggests that children will excuse previously inaccurate behavior if given a reason, such 
as uninformed access, to explain the behavior. Children are attending to information 
available during an interaction about the speaker’s reliability that influences their 
willingness to accept information.   
Children attend to personal characteristics of the speaker when determining 
reliability as well. Jaswal and Neely (2006) examined whether 3- and 4-year-old children 
were more likely to trust age over reliability. Children participated in one of four 
conditions: one where both an adult and a child provided different accurate labels for the 
same objects, one where the adult provided accurate labels but the child did not, one 
where the child provided accurate labels while the adult did not, and one where both the 
adult and child provided inaccurate labels. At test in all conditions, both the adult and 
child provided differing novel labels for the same novel object. Children at both ages 
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were more likely to rely on the label provided by the adult speaker when the adult had 
provided accurate information on previous trials. When the adult provided inaccurate 
information, children were more likely to rely on the child who was providing reliable 
information. The authors conclude that children often rely on adults for accurate 
information about labels, but are also willing to take into account previous reliability 
when choosing whom to trust. 
In addition to relying on a speaker’s past accuracy record, trust in the speaker can 
also be determined by how much knowledge a speaker has about a topic. In the previous 
studies, speakers either provided a label that matched the object being presented or a 
label that matched a different, but not present, familiar object. However, it is rare for 
young children to interact with an adult who earnestly and seriously mislabels familiar 
objects. What is more common is for a child to ask an adult for the label of an object 
unfamiliar to both, such as the case with a child who has a box full of various dinosaur 
genera, asking the adult to name each one individually. In this situation the adult, who is 
ignorant of the label for the object, may provide a verbal cue of his/her ignorance with a 
phrase like, “I don’t know what that is.” An ignorant labeler is one who denies 
knowledge about an object or expresses uncertainty about the information being provided 
during the labeling interaction. 
Young children tend to treat inaccurate and ignorant labelers as two very different 
sources of information. Koenig and Harris (2005) found that 3-year-old children were 
reluctant to learn a novel label for a novel object from an ignorant labeler, but were 
willing to learn from an inaccurate labeler. They attribute this difference in trust to 3-
year-olds lack of understanding of false belief. Because 3-year-olds fail to recognize that 
other people can either hold a false belief about an object label or lie about their 
knowledge of an object and provide an incorrect label, the speaker’s reliability does not 
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influence children’s trust in that particular speaker’s ability to provide accurate labels. 
Four-year-old children are less willing to accept labeling information from both ignorant 
and inaccurate speakers. The authors suggest that the ability to discern whether a speaker 
is providing accurate information is a developmental function that evolves with the 
understanding of false belief. As children gain a greater ability to reason about others’ 
thinking, they become more selective in determining which speakers are providing 
reliable information.  
Another interesting finding from the Koenig and Harris (2005) paper relates to 
what types of decisions children make regarding the reliability of the speaker. Is speaker 
reliability a global or a local trait? Koenig and Harris suggest that previous studies 
focused mainly on the reliability of the speaker being a temporary or fleeting trait 
dependent on the circumstances of the experiment (Povinelli & de Bois, 1992; Robinson 
& Whitcombe, 2003). Of particular interest is how children will act when speaker 
reliability is treated as a more global trait, meaning that the reliability of the speaker 
extends beyond familiarization trials to influence later interactions with the child. They 
interpret their results from the previously described study to support the theory that 
children have a “default trust” (p. 1275) that a speaker will be a reliable labeler. When the 
speaker violates that trust, then children are less likely to rely on that speaker for 
information. The type of violation of this trust will influence how children will react, 
depending on the age of the child. 
If all speakers by default have a score of zero, meaning they are reliable without 
proof, and inaccuracy causes a negative score, then what would lack of knowledge or 
ignorance about an object label cause? Pasquini et al. (2007) claim that every error causes 
a loss of an error point or a decreasing trust in the reliability of the speaker, but it is not 
clear how ignorance would be treated according to this model. Do children consider 
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errors of inaccuracy as being of the same magnitude as lacking knowledge or showing 
ignorance in regard to an object? In the Koenig and Harris (2005) study, 3-year-old 
children judged ignorance as either a stronger cue for unreliability or as a more salient 
cue of unreliability. They were less willing to learn from a speaker who indicated a lack 
of knowledge about the objects being presented than from a speaker who provided 
accurate information. A possible confound in the Koenig and Harris study is that the 
ignorant speaker never provided a label to compete with the accurate speaker’s label 
during the familiarization trials. Children may have learned to rely on the speaker who 
provided labels, regardless of accuracy, and to ignore the speaker who did not provide 
information about objects when determining from whom they should learn novel words. 
The authors acknowledge this point but argue that children were attending to the 
intention of the speakers when deciding who was more reliable. They support their 
argument with evidence that 3-year-old children recognized that the ignorant speaker 
lacked knowledge about labels and therefore, shouldn’t be considered a reliable source of 
information. 
In the Koenig and Harris (2005) study, children were presented with 2 speakers 
who provided information about their reliability during the same trial. Sabbagh, 
Wdowiak, and Ottaway (2003) investigated whether 3- to 4-year-old children would 
disregard a novel label for a novel object from an ignorant labeler if a more confident 
labeler offered an alternative label.  Children interacted with either a knowledgeable or an 
ignorant labeler. The knowledgeable labeler selected an object and said: “”…I know just 
which one’s his fep. It’s this one.” while the ignorant labeler said: “...I don’t know what a 
fep is. Hmmm. Maybe, it’s this one.” Later, a second experimenter entered the room and 
selected a different toy from the one previously labeled and said: “We’ve got a fep.” 
During test trials, children were asked to indicate which novel object, either the one 
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labeled by the first or the second experimenter, was the referent for the novel label. 
Results indicated that children were more likely to select the object labeled by the 
knowledgeable speaker than by the second experimenter. However, children who 
interacted with an ignorant speaker were more willing to apply the novel label provided 
by the second experimenter to the novel object. The authors concluded that children 
disregard information provided by an ignorant speaker while attending to and learning 
from more knowledgeable speakers. Children’s attention to cues regarding a speaker’s 
knowledge helps make word learning faster and more reliable by allowing them to filter 
information from reliable and unreliable sources.  
Sabbagh et al. (2003) also describe the effect of speaker reliability on children’s 
learning abilities. They argue that being exposed to an ignorant labeler does not have a 
negative effect on subsequent learning. Children will not apply their predictions about the 
reliability of an ignorant adult to an unfamiliar adult who has not provided information 
about reliability. How is it that children in Sabbagh et al.’s study were able to decide 
whether to apply the label provided by the first or the second experimenter? One 
possibility that was proposed by Savage and Au (1996) in regards to second label 
learning was that children will retain more than one label for an object in their memory 
and decide later which label is more appropriate to apply to an object. In this scenario, 
children would mark the label provided by the ignorant labeler as being a possible label 
for an object and, upon hearing a more confident speaker provide a new label for the 
same object, reject the label provided by the ignorant labeler because it is deemed less 
appropriate than the new label provided by a confident, seemingly knowledgeable 
speaker. Children who are presented multiple labels for a single object from two 
knowledgeable speakers may have to rely on a different strategy, given that both sources 
of information are confident. Children may choose to interact with the labeler that has 
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provided more accurate information overall, or the labeler that the child has more 
experience with, but there have not yet been studies to examine this question. Children 
may take into account multiple social-pragmatic cues when determining the reliability of 
a speaker who is providing novel information, which may help children overcome 
reference uncertainty. 
Overt ignorance is one of a cluster of cues that can represent a lack of knowledge; 
distraction and hesitation are among these cues as well. Jaswal and Malone (2007) 
examined whether 3-year-old children would learn from speakers who were either 
confident or ignorant when labeling hybrid objects (i.e., novel objects that have qualities 
that fit into two distinct categories, such as a carlike object that also has features of a 
shoe). Children who heard a confident experimenter provide labels were more likely to 
apply a familiar label to a hybrid object than those who heard an ignorant labeler (i.e., “I 
think this is a…”). In a second study, the authors manipulated the type of ignorance that 
the experimenter exemplified using three conditions. In the Ignorant condition, the 
experimenter mislabeled a familiar object before introducing the hybrid object. The 
experimenter acknowledged the error in labeling and attributed the mistake to 
inattentiveness (i.e., “Oops!...Sometimes I don’t look at things as carefully as I should.”). 
This cue towards ignorance differs from those used in other studies by providing an 
excuse for the lack of knowledge (i.e., inattentiveness). In the Distracted condition, the 
experimenter held the hybrid object while confidently labeling it with a familiar label but 
the experimenter directed visual attention towards on a box on the floor in which the 
children could not see the contents. In the Ignorant and Distracted condition, the 
experimenter mislabeled a familiar object, explained that it was due to inattentiveness, 
and then directed visual attention to the box on the floor while labeling the hybrid object 
with a familiar label, as in the Distracted condition. Results indicated the children were 
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willing to learn the familiar labels when the experimenter was Distracted, less willing 
when the experimenter was Ignorant, and even less willing when the experimenter was 
both Ignorant and Distracted. The authors attribute the decreased performance in the 
Ignorant groups to the excuse the experimenter offered for the mislabeling; children were 
provided an explanation for the experimenter’s unusual behavior and were therefore more 
skeptical of later labeling.  
In a previously discussed study (Koenig & Harris, 2005), 3-year-olds are less 
influenced by the inaccuracy of the speaker but are influenced by ignorance, unlike 4-
year-olds who allow violations of both accuracy and ignorance to influence their trust in 
the speaker. Sabbagh and Baldwin (2001) investigated whether 3- and 4-year-old children 
would take into account different types of hesitancy cues when deciding whether to learn 
from a speaker. First, the authors established that both age groups were willing to learn 
novel labels for novel objects when a speaker expressed knowledge of the objects but not 
when a speaker expressed uncertainty. In a follow-up study, the authors varied the types 
of hesitancy cues that the speaker expressed when applying a novel label to a novel 
object. The study contained two conditions: children either interacted with an 
experimenter who had made the toy but was unsure of what to call it or an experimenter 
who was uncertain about the label because a friend had made the toy. The 4-year-olds 
were more willing to learn from an experimenter who expressed first-hand knowledge 
about the toy, even when hesitant about applying a novel label, but would not learn from 
an experimenter who could not provide confident information about the toy. The 3-year-
olds performed poorly on the word learning task in both conditions. The authors conclude 
that children are going beyond just reasoning about the referential cues that speakers 
provide, and are taking into account the type of knowledge that the speaker has. They 
also argue that older children are better able to discern the differences in mental state 
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knowledge by attending to more sophisticated cues that the speaker is providing, while 
younger children may be attending to more salient cues, such as hesitancy. The ability to 
understand social-cues as well as mental state knowledge may help children when 
deciding whether it is appropriate to learn from an unfamiliar speaker.  
Children may have an understanding that social-pragmatic cues provide evidence 
for the type and extent of knowledge that a speaker has about an object. How is it that 
children come to attend to these cues? Their reliance on referential cues, such as eye gaze 
and tone of voice, can only provide a fraction of the information that is necessary to 
determine a speaker’s knowledge state. It is possible that children’s understanding of 
others as individuals with their own distinct knowledge is part of a greater skill set that 
helps children understand the intentions of others on a more general level. Research on 
theory of mind has provided insight into how children come to understand that other 
people provide knowledge that is different from their own knowledge. Children’s 
understanding that a person may provide information that contradicts their present 
knowledge may generate a greater level of skepticism in the information being provided. 
Children may take into account the source of the information and determine whether the 
source is more knowledgeable than they are about the given topic. Children’s ability to 
determine who is a credible source of information becomes more sophisticated as they 
distinguish between accuracy of their own knowledge and the knowledge of another 
speaker. 
THEORY OF MIND 
Given that age differences in children’s understanding of speaker reliability cues 
appear similar to those found in typical theory of mind tasks (Clément et al., 2004), one 
question is how children’s understanding of ignorance relates to their successful 
completion of false belief tasks. Children’s understanding of mental states has been 
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shown to develop in different stages. Hogrefe, Wimmer, and Perner (1986) examined 
how children would respond to ignorance and false belief questions about the same 
interaction. Children either participated in a game with another child or heard stories that 
involved typical false-belief situations (e.g., changing the contents of a box while another 
child is out of the room) and then asking whether the non-present child would know what 
was in the box (Ignorance question) and what that child would say was in the box (False 
Belief question).  Over a series of five different experiments, 3- to 6-year-old children 
were tested on their ability to answer these two different types of questions under 
different circumstances. Results indicated that 3-year-olds were not as successful at 
understanding Ignorance questions as 4-year-olds, and that 5- and 6-year-olds were better 
able to understand False Belief questions than children of younger ages. The authors also 
found a similar developmental difference in the understanding of more sophisticated 
Ignorance and False Belief questions in the older age group. Most 4- to 6-year-olds 
answered the more complicated Ignorance questions correctly but even 6-year-olds found 
the more complex False Belief questions difficult. The authors conclude that Ignorance is 
easier for children to understand because it requires a simple judgment on the mental 
state of a person while False Belief requires additional inferences, such as predicting the 
behavior of another person, on the part of the child about the knowledge that a person 
holds.   
The ability to understand theory of mind/false belief may have origins in infancy. 
Wellman, Lopez-Duran, LaBounty, and Hamilton (2008) investigated whether early 
understanding of intentional acts was associated with later success on theory of mind 
tasks. They examined 11-month-old infants’ attention to actions that were either 
consistent or inconsistent with the expectation of an intentional action. In the consistent 
trials, infants watched a person look favorably at one of two objects during habituation. 
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During the test trial, these infants watched the person hold the object that had been 
viewed favorably. In the inconsistent habituation trials, infants watched a person view 
one object favorably but, during the test trials, hold the object that had not been viewed 
favorably. Infants were later tested on theory of mind tasks at the age of 4 years. Results 
indicated a positive predictive relationship between infants’ attention during the 
intentional actions and later abilities on false belief tasks, even when factoring out such 
variables as verbal and performance competence and executive function/IQ. The authors 
conclude that there is a strong longitudinal relationship between infants’ social attention, 
as measured by their ability to understand intentional actions, and later understanding of 
mental states and theory of mind.  
A similar study investigated the relationship between young children’s imitation 
of intentional actions and later theory of mind abilities. Olineck and Poulin-Dubois 
(2007) examined whether 14- and 18-month-old children would reproduce actions that an 
experimenter intended to produce and whether they would imitate actions that an 
experimenter did not desire or performed accidentally (i.e., “Whoops!”). At the age of 3 
years, approximately half of the children who participated in the initial study also 
completed a series of theory of mind tasks. The authors found that the children who had 
imitated the intentional action were more successful on the theory of mind tasks. Results 
also indicated that measures of theory of mind, and specifically the false belief task, are 
associated with early use of internal state terms. They conclude that there is a link 
between early understanding of adults as intentional beings and later theory of mind 
abilities.  
It is likely that in addition to an understanding of intention, there is also a 
relationship between early language abilities and theory of mind. Watson, Painter, and 
Bornstein (2001) measured 2-year-old children’s comprehension and expressive language 
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as well as maternal reports of child language. At 4 years, children were given a verbal 
intelligence test as well as a false belief task. The authors found a positive correlation 
between early language abilities and performance on the false belief task.  They conclude 
that “more advanced features of language might lead to more advanced false-belief 
understanding later because language underpins the capacity to mark aspects of mind 
such as perspective, intention, obligation, and degree of certainty” (p. 454).  The interplay 
between language and intention seems to be related to the ability to succeed at theory of 
mind tasks and the understanding that others have differing knowledge from oneself.  
If children are able to attend to intentionality cues by the age of 1 year, why do 
they have difficulty understanding false belief tasks at the age of 4 years? One possibility 
is that children’s prior knowledge biases their future predictions. Birch (2005) describes 
this phenomenon as the curse-of-knowledge. In traditional false belief tasks, children are 
presented a scenario in which they know information that someone else does not. In order 
to respond correctly on false belief tasks, participants must ignore their knowledge and 
provide the response that a naïve participant would. Children below the age of 4 years 
have difficulty responding to questions about the beliefs that another person would have.  
Birch suggests that once both children and adults have access to information, it then 
becomes difficult to inhibit that information. Both age groups find questions that involve 
disregarding prior accurate information to be problematic. Birch also suggests that this 
curse-of-knowledge bias predicts that children will “have difficulty appreciating another 
person’s perspective when they are knowledgeable, but not when they are ignorant” 
(p.26). This implies that children may be more willing to understand another person’s 
perspective when they do not have previous information that contradicts it.  
But what happens when the children are asked to provide an explanation for why 
someone is purposefully providing inaccurate information? Three-year-old children were 
 32 
more willing to rely on the information provided by an unreliable labeler than 4-year-old 
children (Clément et al., 2004; Koenig & Harris, 2005), but it is unclear how children 
interpret the intentions of the labeler. Research investigating deception provides the 
opportunity to examine children’s understanding of the interaction between speaker 
reliability and intentionality. Deception is a situation in which children “have already 
acquired certain real world knowledge and a speaker’s verbal statement is inconsistent 
with this knowledge, [children] may use this inconsistency to decide not to believe the 
speaker’s statement” (p.1689) (Lee, Cameron, Doucette, & Talwar, 2002). Lee et al. 
(2002) investigated children’s understanding of intentionally misleading statements (e.g., 
lies) about a fantastical event. Children, ages 3 to 6 years, interacted with an adult 
confederate who told a story about a fantastical entity (i.e., a ghost). After children left 
the room, a glass was broken. When children returned to the room, the adult confederate 
claimed that the ghost from the book had appeared and broken the glass. Three- and 4-
year-old children were more willing than 5- and 6-year-old children to believe the 
confederate’s fantastical explanation of the event. By 5 to 6 years of age, children 
typically identified that the adult was providing false information, and these children 
were more likely to indicate that the adult was doing so in order to avoid responsibility 
for an action. The authors conclude that younger children have more difficulty 
distinguishing between real and fantastical events and therefore, are more likely to agree 
with an experimenter who provides an implausible excuse for an action than older 
children. Children’s confidence in their own knowledge may influence their willingness 
to trust information provided by others.  
Lee et al.’s (2002) study introduces an interesting topic to the discussion of 
accuracy and reliability: how do children understand when an adult is purposefully 
providing information to mislead? They conclude that young children simply do not have 
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the world knowledge to understand that a fantastical creature is not a plausible actor in a 
real-world event. Given the review of the literature on children’s assumptions regarding 
speaker reliability, it could also be possible that young children are using the information 
provided by the adult to confirm their existing knowledge about the possibility that 
fantastical entities exist. I have discussed children’s willingness to learn novel 
information from reliable adults, and that adults do not have to provide information about 
the extent of their knowledge in order for children to assume that they are accurate 
sources of information.  It could be that, in the 3- to 4-year-old children’s view, the adult 
experimenter who provides the fantastical excuse for a situation is not purposely 
misleading them, but instead is providing accurate information that confirms the 
children’s suspicions that fantastical creatures may actually be real. Lee et al. (2002) 
found that children were more willing to believe the confederate’s fantastical explanation 
if they already had the belief that ghosts may exist in reality. Even if children were 
uncertain about fantastical entities before the experiment, during the experiment the adult 
is encouraging a fantastical belief. The 6-year-old children in Lee et al.’s study were less 
likely to hold fantastical beliefs than the younger children and were also more willing to 
reject the confederate’s fantastical explanation. If children are confident in their 
knowledge, or their beliefs, they may be less likely to be influenced by a speaker who 
provides information that does not match their own.  
Bergstrom, Moehlmann, and Boyer (2006) suggest young children, when 
presented with novel information, first accept the information and later evaluate it “in 
cases where they have sufficient opportunity, motivation, or previous information” (p. 
532). They argue that the default behavior for children is to initially believe in the novel 
information being provided and, upon reflection, choose to reject the information or 
accept it given that there is no alternative explanation/theory (i.e., children don’t have 
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proof that the Earth doesn’t revolve around the Sun, so they accept this as a true 
statement when taught in Science class). If children have the ability to discredit the 
information being provided, whether because the source is unreliable or they have 
knowledge about the topic that contradicts the information being provided, they will 
choose to disregard the novel information. The next section of this paper will discuss 
children’s willingness to learn a novel label for an object that is familiar to them, 
typically referred to as second label learning. Given children’s existing knowledge about 
the object being labeled, they have the option to accept or reject the information being 
provided.  
SECOND LABEL LEARNING 
Second label learning may provide insight into both children’s confidence in their 
own knowledge as well as the influence of speaker reliability. Children’s willingness to 
apply a second label to a familiar object is an area of research that has provided much 
debate. This section will begin with a discussion regarding research examining children’s 
application of Mutual Exclusivity, a proposed word-learning bias which posits that young 
children are less willing to apply a second label to an object for which they already have 
a label (Markman, 1990). This bias would simplify word learning by restricting the 
number of possible referents that may apply to an object. If children are attending to 
social cues provided by the speaker and relying on word learning biases, such as Mutual 
Exclusivity (e.g., Au & Glusman, 1990; Jaswal & Hansen, 2006; Liittschwager & 
Markman, 1994; Markman, 1990; Markman, Wasow, & Hansen, 2003; Markman & 
Wachtel, 1988; Merriman & Stevenson, 1997), then the question of how children 
incorporate social information that either reinforces or directly violates the tenets of the 
bias is raised. I will discuss alternative accounts to Mutual Exclusivity and conclude with 
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a discussion of how second label learning research may provide insights into children’s 
understanding of speaker reliability.  
Children who are learning novel label-novel object associations do not already 
have a label that could be assigned to the object. These children might be willing to 
accept a novel name, even from a previously unreliable source, because they have no 
other options (Koenig & Harris, 2005). Children who are learning a second label for a 
familiar object already have a name that could be applied to the object, so it is possible 
that they will be more selective in who they are willing to accept information from. 
Woodward and Markman (1988) presented 3- to 4-year-old children with a familiar 
object and a novel object while they heard a novel label. Children honored the Mutual 
Exclusivity assumption and chose the novel object as the referent of the novel label. 
Woodward and Markman suggested that children would maintain the Mutual Exclusivity 
assumption unless there is prominent contextual evidence that it should be overridden.  
They propose that given a situation in which children are presented with a familiar object 
and a novel label, the children have three possible choices: They may choose to violate 
Mutual Exclusivity and accept a second label for the familiar object. They may choose to 
reject the novel label by not applying it to the familiar object. Finally, they may choose to 
apply the novel label to a part of the familiar object. Each of these possibilities is 
dependent on the context in which the novel label is applied to the object. 
Mutual Exclusivity is evident in children during the early stages of language 
development. Markman, Wasow, and Hansen (2003) examined whether children as 
young as 15 months of age would apply the Mutual Exclusivity assumption during novel 
label learning, without the use of explicit referential cues. By examining object choices 
and searching behavior for a referent of the label, Markman et al. determined that 15- to 
19-month-old participants avoided applying a second label to an object for which they 
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already had a name. This provides evidence that the Mutual Exclusivity assumption is 
present early in word learning and is applied by children when referential cues by the 
speaker and environment are not evident.  
In ambiguous situations, Mutual Exclusivity may help children identify a new 
category. In a study by Merriman and Stevenson (1997), 24- to 25-month-old children 
were told a series of stories involving atypical exemplars of objects for which they 
already had labels, such as a horse with an elongated nose and unusually shaped body, 
and were tested on whether they would apply either a familiar label or a novel label to 
such objects. Merriman and Stevenson found that children avoided applying the familiar 
label to the atypical exemplar when the atypical exemplar had been labeled with a novel 
label. The assumption that a label has only one referent could facilitate language learning 
by helping children to link labels with appropriate categories.  
Given that Mutual Exclusivity is evident as early as 15 months (Markman et al., 
2003), it might be asked when children overcome the Mutual Exclusivity assumption and 
learn more than one label for an object. It will be necessary during a child’s development 
to attribute multiple labels to objects. Objects are often referred to with more than one 
label (e.g., a cup is also referred to as a glass, a mug, and a tumbler) and children will be 
required to learn multiple referents for a single object in order to understand a language. 
Liittschwager and Markman (1994) note that the Mutual Exclusivity assumption does not 
deny dual label learning in its entirety, but that it does indicate that it is easier to learn the 
first label when compared to learning the second label. Children, aged 24 months, 
participated in one of two conditions: They were either trained with a novel label on an 
unfamiliar object or with a novel label on a familiar item that children are likely to label 
incorrectly (e.g., a unicorn, which children are likely to label as a horse). Children in both 
conditions were then tested on their ability to recognize the trained novel name and their 
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willingness to apply a different novel label to the target object. Liittschwager and 
Markman found that 24-month-olds readily learned the trained novel name for the target 
object in both the familiar and unfamiliar conditions. Two-year-old children were willing 
to apply multiple labels to an object, overriding Mutual Exclusivity. Liittschwager and 
Markman attribute this failure to honor Mutual Exclusivity to the strong evidence that the 
novel label refers to the familiar object through repeated labeling (i.e., each object was 
labeled 6 times). These results indicate that 24-month-old children can override Mutual 
Exclusivity when provided with clear cues of the referent if the task is sufficiently 
simple. 
Children are often faced with situations where more than one label is applied to a 
given object, violating Mutual Exclusivity. Savage and Au (1996) investigated how 
children between the ages of 3- to 5-years-old would react when they were in a situation 
in which a novel object was given two novel labels. One label was introduced by a 
familiar person, the child’s preschool teacher, and the other by an unfamiliar person, an 
experimenter, who had not overheard the label used by the familiar person. The children 
were tested on production and comprehension of both novel labels. Over a series of 4 
studies, the authors found that about half of the children were willing to accept both 
labels for a single object when offered by two different people, regardless of familiarity. 
The half that tended to honor Mutual Exclusivity showed an interesting pattern of 
responding; children tended to favor the first label they were tested on as the proper label 
for the object, suggesting that they kept both labels in memory and then focused their 
attention on the first label that the experimenter asked them to apply. It is possible that 
children consider both familiar and unfamiliar adults as reliable sources of information 
and wait to see which information will be more relevant for use in future tasks.  
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Parent conversation cues can also provide evidence for children that an object can 
have more than one name. Callanan and Sabbagh (2004) studied whether the parents of 
12- to 24-month-old children would use multiple labels while interacting with both 
familiar and unfamiliar objects. Their results suggest that parents are more likely to use 
multiple labels for the same object when their children have high productive vocabulary 
abilities. When introducing multiple labels, however, parents were more likely to bridge 
the labels in such a way as to indicate that there is only one correct or best label that 
applies to each object (e.g., “Look’s like a walrus. Or, no, that’s a sea lion.”). The authors 
argue that children with more advanced productive vocabulary scores are given greater 
access to multiple labels, especially for unfamiliar objects, and that the bridging phrases 
that parents use may provide a context for them to understand the use of each of the 
labels. This study suggests that children are attending to the socio-pragmatic 
evidence/context when labels are being produced in order to discern what is the most 
appropriate label for an object, especially when more than one label is provided.   
Children in a bilingual environment must learn more than one word for an object, 
and to be successful in doing so, they will need to be able to override Mutual Exclusivity. 
Research regarding bilingualism and Mutual Exclusivity is limited and, often times, 
contradictory. Merriman and Kutlesic (1993) found that both monolingual and bilingual 
children, between the ages of 5 and 8 years, successfully applied Mutual Exclusivity 
when extending the use of two novel English words. They also found a difference in that 
bilingual children more readily applied labels from a different language onto objects for 
which they already had a label. Au and Glusman (1990) found that both monolingual and 
bilingual 4-year-old children were able to successfully overcome Mutual Exclusivity 
when presented dual labels for objects in different languages. They suggest that children 
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are able to make exceptions to Mutual Exclusivity based upon their knowledge that 
foreign languages have different labels for the same object.  
But what about when a speaker provides more than one label for the same object 
in one language? Davidson and Tell (2005) investigated how bilingual and monolingual 
children, ages 3- and 4-years-old as well as 5- and 6-years-old, would respond when an 
object that was familiar to them was given a novel label. They found that bilingual 
children were less likely than monolingual children to rely on Mutual Exclusivity when 
applying novel labels to familiar objects. The authors conclude that bilingual children 
may rely on similar word-learning assumptions as monolingual children, but that they are 
more flexible in applying them given the ambiguity in their word-learning environment. 
Although children can override Mutual Exclusivity when given the cues to do so, 
both adults and children will adhere to the Mutual Exclusivity assumption when 
information suggests that it is appropriate. Au and Glusman (1990) tested 3- to 6-year-old 
children and university students to determine whether Mutual Exclusivity is evident even 
after childhood.  Both age groups were presented with a novel object paired with a novel 
label. Participants were then asked to match the novel label to the correct novel object, as 
well as indicate if there was more than one matching object within a set of four objects, 
two objects each from two different categories. They were also asked to match a different 
novel word to the same object group. Both adults and children honored the Mutual 
Exclusivity Assumption by not applying the different novel word to the previously 
labeled novel object. They also extended both of the novel labels to apply to the separate 
category pairs, so they generalized their learning of the novel labels. Both adults and 
children will adhere to Mutual Exclusivity when information in their environment 
indicates this assumption should be used, as well as disregard Mutual Exclusivity when it 
is proper to do so.  
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Mutual Exclusivity is one of a number of proposed principles available that may 
help to explain how words are learned. Mervis, Golinkoff, and Bertrand (1994) argue for 
the Novel Name-Nameless Category principle, which states that children will apply novel 
words to objects for which they do not have a label. The most significant difference 
between Mutual Exclusivity and N3C is that N3C proponents argue that this principle is 
not available until after children have reached the vocabulary spurt (Golinkoff, Mervis, & 
Hirsch-Pasek, 1994). While N3C and Mutual Exclusivity offer similar predictions 
towards how children will respond during second label learning, N3C would not be a 
readily available principle in young children’s understanding of early word learning. 
Another difference is that N3C is only applicable when a novel object is available to 
which children can apply the novel name (Mervis et al., 1994). N3C does not account for 
situations in which children hear a novel label in the presence of a familiar object, 
without a novel object available. Mervis et al. argue that in these situations, children will 
either accept the second label or attend to pragmatic cues as to the speaker’s intentions. 
The review of Mutual Exclusivity has provided evidence that children as young as 15 
months of age avoid applying a second label to a familiar object (Markman et al., 2003), 
which is before the vocabulary spurt is evident. Also, Mutual Exclusivity does not require 
that a novel object be present in order for children to apply its restriction. Children have 
three possible outcomes upon hearing a novel label applied to a familiar object: they can 
accept the second label as another referent for the object, they can reject the label as a 
referent, or they can apply the novel label to a part of the object being referred to. 
Children attend to the referential cues of the speaker when determining which outcome is 
the most appropriate (Woodward & Markman, 1998).  
Another early word learning hypothesis is the social pragmatic account, which 
argues that children use cues from the speaker to hone in on word meanings (Bloom, 
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2000; Clark, 1988, 1990, 1997). Recent research by Jaswal and Hansen (2006) has 
argued that Mutual Exclusivity should produce differing predictions than a social 
pragmatic account of word learning.  They proposed that Mutual Exclusivity causes 
children to disregard information that conflicts with the novel label-novel object 
association, such as referential intent cues by the speaker, during early word learning. In 
their study, 3- and 4-year-old children were presented with two objects, one familiar and 
one novel. The speaker pointed to the familiar object while looking at the child and said, 
“Can you give me the blicket?” Results indicated that children discounted the pointing 
gesture and chose the novel object as the referent for the novel label, adhering to the 
Mutual Exclusivity assumption. One could argue that children disregarded the finger 
pointing gesture because it was not as strong as other referential cues, such as eye-gaze. 
In a second study, Jaswal and Hansen (2006) conducted a similar experiment 
manipulating the speaker’s gaze. Three and 4-year-old children were presented a familiar 
and a novel object, but when the experimenter asked, “Can you give me the blicket?” the 
question was accompanied with a pronounced change in the gaze of the speaker towards 
the familiar object. They replicated the results of the previous study in that children chose 
the novel object as the referent for the novel word, even when the pragmatic cues of the 
speaker were indicating the familiar object. The authors do not deny that children attend 
to referential intent cues, but they do propose that Mutual Exclusivity is a stronger 
constraint and it will be adhered to when there is not overwhelming evidence in the 
environment that suggests otherwise. 
One difference between the Jaswal and Hansen (2006) study and the others 
reported here is the use of structured versus naturalistic cues. The Jaswal and Hansen 
study used social cues that were very formal in nature: the pointing cue was a finger 
placed in the table while the experimenter maintained eye contact with the child. The 
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experimenter tapped the table twice to draw attention to the finger point. The authors 
acknowledge that there may be pragmatic cues that will override Mutual Exclusivity, 
especially when social cues are explicitly referring to an object. 
 Given that children take into account speaker reliability when learning novel 
labels for novel objects, would this referential cue provide information about the 
application of a second label to a familiar object? Birch, Vauthier, and Bloom (2008) 
used a paradigm that varies from the previous studies to examine 3- and 4-year-old 
children’s willingness to learn a novel label for a novel object. In their study, two puppets 
representing a previously accurate and a previously inaccurate labeler applied the same 
novel label to different novel objects (i.e., Ben, the accurate labeler, called a novel object 
a “ferber” and then Jenny, the inaccurate labeler, called a different novel object a 
“ferber”). Children were then asked to select which object was the referent to the novel 
label used by both labelers.  Birch et al. found that children were more willing to apply 
the novel label to the accurate labeler’s referent. To extend their findings, Birch et al. 
investigated children’s willingness to apply a second label to an object that had 
previously been labeled by either an accurate or an inaccurate labeler. In this condition, 
the puppets each applied the same label to different objects, replicating the beginning of 
the previous condition. The difference in this condition was the children were asked to 
select the object that was the referent of a novel label that had not previously been heard 
(i.e., children saw both Ben and Jenny apply the label “ferber” to different novel objects, 
but were asked to find the “modi”). Results indicated that children were less likely to 
apply the entirely novel label to the object that had previously been labeled by the 
accurate labeler. The authors conclude that children are more willing to apply to the 
Mutual Exclusivity assumption when social cues reinforce their expectations that a 
speaker is reliable. 
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Second Label Learning also provides the opportunity to examine many of the 
concepts that will be discussed throughout this paper, such as how social pragmatic cues 
influence children’s willingness to learn novel information. Many of the cues that 
speakers provide when interacting with children can be examined with regard to 
children’s willingness to apply a novel label to an object for which they already have a 
label. Children’s confidence in their own knowledge of a label, their familiarity with the 
objects being labeled, and their understanding of others’ intentions may all play a part in 
their willingness to learn from others (Clark, 1983, 1987; Golinkoff, Mervis, & Hirsch-
Pasek, 1994; Jaswal & Hansen, 2006; Markman, 1990; Markman & Wachtel, 1988; 
Mervis & Bertrand, 1994; Mervis, Golinkoff, & Bertrand, 1994). Also, children’s own 
knowledge and experience is a factor in second label learning. By examining situations in 
which children have their own knowledge challenged by novel information, a more 
distinct sense of children’s interpretation of reliability may be determined.  
SUMMARY 
This review focused on three questions that would help guide the discussion on 
referential intent cues in the greater context of early word learning and later theory of 
mind. With regard to the first question, speaker reliability was discussed in terms of being 
one of many social-pragmatic cues that children attend to in order to aid in the 
understanding of others’ intentions and goals. Children make judgments about a 
speaker’s referential intent using both nonverbal behavioral cues, such as eye-gaze, and 
verbal cues, such as the accuracy of the information the speaker provides about an object. 
By attending to referential cues, children are able to hone in on meaning by narrowing the 
number of possible interpretations for a novel word and assessing the likelihood that a 
label is accurate. 
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It would be overwhelming to have to keep track of every instance of accurate and 
inaccurate behavior that a speaker may provide, so it is possible that children are 
simplifying the information by judging the overall reliability of a speaker. One example 
would be the child’s mother, who often provides generally acceptable labels for novel 
objects (i.e., that four legged, hairy, medium size animal is a “dog” and is called that 
same label by more than one person). A child’s mother may not always have the accepted 
label for every object, as in the case of those pesky dinosaur names, but overall she is a 
reliable source of linguistic information. This ability to attend to overall accuracy 
develops with age and experience: as children learn more about a speaker’s mental state, 
they are then able to make more accurate judgments about reliability.  
The second question relates to children’s understanding of speaker reliability. As 
children grow older, they gain a better understanding of the cues that describe a person’s 
knowledge. Three-year-old children may be more susceptible to inaccuracy, and in turn 
deception, because they do not have a sophisticated understanding of others’ mental 
states. As children’s theory of mind becomes more adult-like, they are better able to make 
judgments about other people’s mental states. Children also take into account the 
reliability information provided by the speakers, such as their familiarity, experience, 
ignorance, and knowledge, when determining whether to learn novel information. 
Finally, I discussed how children’s understanding of speaker reliability may be 
better understood by examining their willingness to learn second labels for familiar 
objects. During second label learning, one must take into account both the child’s 
knowledge and the speaker’s knowledge when interacting in a language task. As children 
gain a more sophisticated level of understanding others’ mental states, they are able to 
make decisions about whether their knowledge is more reliable than another person’s 
information.  
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Children’s ability to attend to social-pragmatic cues is part of a more 
encompassing understanding of other people as sources of information. Children may 
apply assumptions, both about other people and more specifically about objects, to 
simplify the amount of information they must attend to in their environment. Children’s 
understanding of other people as intentional beings with their own knowledge helps in 
early word learning. It guides children’s willingness to learn from others as well as 
influences their confidence in their own knowledge. Children benefit from the 
combination of understanding that individuals have their own mental states, and that 
referential intent cues provide information about those mental states. The purpose of the 
present research is to examine children’s understanding of referential cues that offer 
information regarding a speaker’s knowledge about objects. A better perspective on 
children’s interpretation of mental state cues is gained by examining their willingness to 
learn either first or second labels for objects. This study investigated whether children 
take into account a speaker’s intentions, as indicated by the speaker’s verbal and 
nonverbal behavior, in deciding whether to adhere to or override Mutual Exclusivity. 
Koenig, Clément, and Harris (2004) found that 3-year-old children were less 
likely to use speaker reliability than 4-year-old children, but that this difference was due 
to the younger children’s difficulties in identifying and retaining information about 
speaker accuracy. To address this issue, Krogh-Jespersen and Echols (2009) made 
reliability cues offered by the speaker highly salient and, to simplify the memory 
demands, a single labeler provided either accurate or inaccurate labels (in contrast with 
the procedure used by Harris, Koenig, and colleagues, which uses two labelers). Because 
little is known about the degree to which children younger than 3 years make use of 
previous reliability, this study focused on 24-month-old children. Children were tested to 
determine whether they would learn either a novel label for an object that was unfamiliar 
 46 
to them or a second label for an object for which they already had a label. Children were 
willing to learn a novel label for a novel object from both an accurate and an inaccurate 
labeler. However, children were less willing to learn a second label for a familiar object 
from an inaccurate labeler than an accurate labeler. It may be that a second label task is 
more sensitive because children can rely on their own knowledge if they have reason to 
doubt the information provided by an unreliable labeler. By simplifying the amount of 
information that children had to attend to, young children’s willingness to learn novel 
label information from accurate and inaccurate speakers can be examined. 
Perhaps both prior knowledge and referential intent play a role in children’s 
willingness to accept a novel label from either a reliable or an unreliable labeler for an 
unfamiliar versus a familiar object. Prior research suggests that, by the age of 4 years, 
children are reluctant to learn a novel label for a novel object from either an ignorant 
labeler or an inaccurate labeler. However, 3-year-old children are skeptical only of 
ignorant speakers (Koenig & Harris, 2005). Birch et al. (2008) found that 3- to 4-year-old 
children would adhere to the restrictions of Mutual Exclusivity, meaning they would 
restrict the number of labels that could apply to an object that had been previously been 
given a label by an accurate speaker, when speaker reliability cues indicated that the 
speaker was an accurate source of information. Children in the Krogh-Jespersen and 
Echols study were more willing to apply a novel label to a familiar object, thereby 
overriding Mutual Exclusivity, when they had interacted with a previously accurate adult 
speaker than a previously inaccurate adult speaker.  
My dissertation research further investigates how 24-month-old children respond 
to cues regarding a speaker’s reliability by contrasting their responses to a speaker who is 
knowledgeable about objects against one who is ignorant or uncertain when providing 
labels for familiar objects. Little is known about children’s understanding of speaker 
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reliability cues during novel label learning at such a young age. Children’s understanding 
of referential cues and mental state knowledge is an area of research that provides insight 
into how children are interpreting the social information in their environment when 
learning novel information from an unknown speaker.  
In Study 1, two-year-old children were exposed to a speaker who established 
either his/her knowledge or ignorance about a series of familiar objects. The speaker does 
not provide explicit labeling information to indicate his or her accuracy, instead 
providing information about his or her mental state knowledge. Children are able to judge 
the reliability of the speaker based on verbal phrases indicating the speaker’s familiarity 
with the objects and referential cues, such as tone of voice and facial expression. Children 
then heard novel labels either for familiar or novel objects, and their willingness to apply 
those labels was tested. In Study 2, a more nuanced understanding of speaker credibility 
was investigated by having two-year-old children interact with an uncertain speaker. The 
uncertain speaker presented a lack of confidence in the knowledge s/he had with 
statements like: “I think that’s a ____.” Children in the uncertain condition heard the 
objects labeled either accurately or inaccurately. Children’s willingness to apply a second 
label to a familiar object was examined. 
When speaker reliability cues support the expectation that an adult is 
knowledgeable about objects, children may accept novel label information about both 
novel and familiar objects, learning a second label for the familiar object. However, when 
speaker reliability cues do not support that a speaker is a credible source of information, 
as in the case of an ignorant or an uncertain labeler, children may choose to reject the 
information provided by the speaker and rely instead on their own knowledge. 
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Chapter 3: Study 1 
METHOD 
Participants 
Sixty-four children (32 males and 32 females) within the ages of 24-25 months 
(M = 24.47 months, range = 23.70 to 25.90 months) participated in this study. The 
sample primarily was Caucasian and middle class (White-72%, Hispanic/ Latino-15%, 
Asian American- 8%, African American–3%, Other-2%). According to parental report, 
none of the participants heard a language other than English for more than 20% of their 
total language exposure. Participants were recruited from a database maintained at a 
university research lab. Each child participated individually in one thirty-minute 
experimental session and was given a small token of appreciation (e.g., a t-shirt) for 
participation. 
Materials and Design 
This study has a between-subjects design in which each condition had a total of 
16 participants, with equal numbers of males and females within each condition. Children 
interacted with either a Knowledgeable or Ignorant speaker, who, after establishing 
reliability, provided novel labels for either familiar or novel objects. One quarter of the 
children in this study interacted with a Knowledgeable speaker during the reliability 
period and then heard that speaker provide novel labels for novel objects (First Label 
Knowledgeable condition); one quarter interacted with an Ignorant speaker who later 
provided novel labels for novel objects (First Label Ignorant condition); one quarter 
interacted with a Knowledgeable speaker who later provided novel labels for familiar 
objects (Second Label Knowledgeable condition); and one quarter interacted with an 
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Ignorant speaker who later provided novel labels for familiar objects (Second Label 
Ignorant condition). Prior to the study, parents completed a vocabulary checklist to 
determine their child’s familiarity with the objects and labels that were to be used during 
the experimental session (see Appendix A). The checklist consists of a list of toys and 
household items selected from the MacArthur-Bates Communicative Development 
Inventories (CDI; Fensen, Dale, Reznick, Thal, Bates, Hartung, Pethick, & Reilly, 1993) 
and from suggestions from participants in prior studies. Six objects reported by parents to 
be known to their child were selected for use in the reliability period of the study. Four 
additional objects, 2 targets and 2 distracters, were used during Novel Label and test 
trials. Objects presented the during the Novel Label trials were consistent across subjects, 
whereas objects presented during the reliability period varied depending on the 
vocabulary of the participant.  
For First Label conditions, the target objects used for the test trials consisted of 
one of two sets of novel objects for which a 24-month-old child is unlikely to know a 
label. The two sets of novel objects were: (1) half of a purple spiky ball and an abstract 
bird stamp and (2) a spinning top and a wooden bell-shaped toy. One set of novel objects 
was used as the target objects and the other set served as the novel distracters. For Second 
Label conditions, the two target objects used for the test trials were highly familiar items: 
a stuffed toy dog and a blue ball. One of the two sets of novel objects described above 
was used as distracters in the test trials. The use of each set, as well as order of 
presentation, was counterbalanced in each condition. 
Procedure 
Before the experiment began, children were given a familiarization period with 
the objects that were to be used in the testing phase of the experiment in order to decrease 
the likelihood that object or novelty preferences would affect performance during test 
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trials. In the First Label conditions, children were allowed to play with the four novel 
objects. For the Second Label conditions, they were given an opportunity to play with a 
dog, a ball and the two novel objects that would serve as distracters. The familiarization 
period lasted until the child had played with each object. If the child did not attend to a 
particular object, the experimenter selected each object once and said, “Look at that one,” 
so that each object had been attended to during the familiarization period. No labels were 
used during this time. Following familiarization, the objects were placed in a red covered 
box. The box was placed on the floor and hid all of the objects from view during the 
labeling procedure.  
The familiarization period was followed by a reliability period in which the 
experimenter established the credibility of his/her labeling behavior and, specifically, 
his/her level of knowledge of object names. During this period, children either sat on 
their parent’s lap or stood in front of their parent, across from a seated experimenter. The 
experimenter chose a familiar object (one indicated by the parent as known to the child) 
out of the red box, held it out and looked at the child to initiate eye contact, then looked 
at the object and kept focus on the object being referred to throughout the remainder of 
the trial. The experimenter referred to the object in a way that indicated the level of the 
experimenter’s familiarity. In both conditions, after the first phrase referencing the object 
had been produced, the experimenter then placed the object within the child’s hands to 
increase the child’s interest in the object being referenced. If the child did not indicate 
any interest in holding the object being referenced, the experimenter placed the object on 
the table halfway between the child and the experimenter. After referring to the object 5 
times, the experimenter replaced the object in the red box, chose a second object, and 
repeated the process with the new object for a total of 6 such reliability trials. 
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During the reliability period, children interacted with either a Knowledgeable or 
an Ignorant speaker. The experimenter communicated his or her degree of familiarity 
with the object through the wording and expressive cues presented during the trials. 
Children in the Knowledgeable condition interacted with an experimenter who referred to 
the familiar object being presented with the phrase: “I know what that is. What’s that? I 
know what that is. What’s that? I know what that is.” Each object was referred to 5 times 
in this manner in order to maintain consistency with the Novel Label trials, as will be 
described (see Appendix B for scripts for each condition). The Knowledgeable speaker 
appeared confident when referring to the object. For children in the Ignorant condition, 
the experimenter displayed a clear lack of knowledge about both the familiar object and 
its name through the following phrasing: “I don’t know what that is. What’s that? I don’t 
know what that is. What’s that? I don’t know what that is.” The Ignorant speaker 
maintained a demeanor of confusion and unfamiliarity with the object being presented. 
Consequently, children could base their judgments of the credibility of the speaker both 
using the phrases provided and the social-pragmatic information available. The 
knowledgeable speaker was confident and neutral when referring to objects whereas the 
ignorant speaker reflected a lack of knowledge in tone of voice, body posture and facial 
expression. These cues were salient indicators of the speaker’s trust in his or her own 
knowledge.  
After the reliability period in which the experimenter either appeared 
Knowledgeable or Ignorant about the referent objects, children were presented with two 
Novel Label trials. Children in the First Label conditions heard a novel label applied to a 
novel object whereas children in Second Label conditions heard a novel label applied to a 
familiar object. The Novel Label trials were identical to the previous trials in object 
presentation. Each object was taken from the red box and labeled 5 times while the child 
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was attending to it. For the Second Label Conditions, the two Novel Label trials made 
use of a toy dog and a ball.  For the First Label Conditions, the two Novel Label trials 
each made use of a novel toy; because these toys are unfamiliar, children should not 
already have a label for them. Across conditions, the experimenter confidently labeled 
these objects using the following phrases, one per Novel Label trial, “That’s a danu” and 
“That’s a gep.” Children heard each object labeled 5 times with one of the nonsense 
words per trial. The object presented in each trial was thus referred to a total of 5 times. 
The order of the presentation of the label, as well as the assignment of the label to the 
object, was counterbalanced within conditions.  
Following the two Novel Label trials, the experimenter conducted two test trials 
during which four objects were placed on the table in front of the child: an object from a 
Novel Label trial, two randomly chosen objects from the six presented during the 
reliability period, and one unfamiliar object that had not previously been labeled. The 
experimenter asked the child to indicate the referent for each of the novel labels that had 
been previously presented by saying: “Where’s a (nonsense word)? Can you point to the 
(nonsense word)?” If the child did not respond, the experimenter prompted again: “Can 
you point to a (nonsense word)?” The child was praised regardless of which objects he or 
she chose. The positioning of the objects varied across trials and was counterbalanced 
across children within a condition such that a particular object appeared equally often on 
the left, the right, the inside, and the outside of the 4 objects presented at test. The study 
session was videotaped using a camcorder. See Figure 1 for a schematic of the procedure. 
SCORING 
For each trial, a correct choice, meaning the child chose the object that was 
labeled with the novel word, was given a score of one. If the child chose incorrectly, 
meaning the child chose either one of the two familiar objects or the novel object that had 
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not been given a label, the child was given a score of zero. A refusal to choose any object 
was coded as a zero as well. Responses were combined across the two test trials to yield a 
coding score of either zero correct, one correct, or two correct. 
RESULTS 
A chi-square analysis revealed a significant difference in the frequencies of 
children who responded by choosing the target object on zero, one, and two test trials 
depending on condition, [χ2 (3, N=64) = 16.6, p = .01]. Table 1 shows the frequencies of 
children in each condition who responded by choosing an exemplar on zero, one, and two 
test trials for each of the following answer types: target object choices, familiar distracter 
choices, novel distracter choices, and refusals to choose.  
Follow up t-tests revealed that participants did not differ in their target object 
choices between the First Label Knowledgeable condition (M = 1.19, SD = .66) and the 
Second Label Knowledgeable condition (M = 1.06, SD = .57), t (30) = -.57, p =. 57 (this 
and all t-tests to follow are two-tailed). However, participants in the First Label Ignorant 
condition (M = 1.19, SD = .91) were more likely to chose the target object as the referent 
than participants in the Second Label Ignorant condition (M = 0.63, SD = .50), t (30) = -
2.17, p = .04. Participants in the Second Label Knowledgeable condition were also more 
likely to select the target as the referent than were participants in the Second Label 
Ignorant condition, t (30)= -2.3, p = 03. Finally, it is interesting to note that participants 
in the First Label Knowledgeable condition did not differ from participants in the First 
Label Ignorant condition, t (30) = .00, p = 1.00 (see Figure 2 for a graph of means with 
standard errors across conditions). These results suggest that children were more likely to 
learn a second label for a familiar object from a knowledgeable speaker than an ignorant 
one. In contrast, when the object was novel, children were willing to learn regardless of 
previous reliability.  
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Tests against chance also were conducted as a measure of learning of novel labels. 
A chance level of .25 (1 in 4 objects) per trial was used to determine children’s likelihood 
of selecting the target object. Using a one-sample t-test, children’s target object choices 
in the First Label Knowledgeable condition, t(15) = -4.20, p = .00, the Second Label 
Knowledgeable condition, t(15) = 3.90, p = .00, and the First Label Ignorant condition, 
t(15) = 3.02, p = .01, were above chance levels. Children in the Second Label Ignorant 
condition did not differ significantly from chance, t(15) = 1.00, p = .33. 
A chi–square analysis examining whether children selected the target object 
choice correctly on the 1st or the 2nd test trial (i.e., the number of children per condition 
who selected the target object correctly on the 1st trial compared with the number of 
children per condition who selected the target object correctly on the second trial) 
revealed no significant differences, [χ2 (3, N=64) = 1.36, p = .71]. These results suggest 
that children did not have difficulty retaining information about the target referent across 
trials and that the task did not tax their memory capabilities. 
When participants selected the wrong object, they made revealing errors. Recall 
that in the test trials, children were presented with the target object, two previously 
labeled familiar distracters and a novel distracter that had not been given a label. A chi-
square analysis was conducted in which children were grouped based on their scores (i.e., 
the number of children choosing 0, 1, or 2 familiar distracters across the 2 test trials). 
This analysis revealed that participants in the Second Label Ignorant condition were more 
likely to choose a familiar distracter as the referent for the novel label than were 
participants in the First Label Ignorant condition [χ2 (2, N=32) = 8.57, p = .01]. 
Participants in the Second Label Knowledgeable condition were also more likely to 
choose a familiar distracter as the referent for the novel label than were participants in the 
First Label Knowledgeable condition [χ2 (2, N=32) = 6.07, p = .048]. There were no 
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differences in familiar distracter choices between the First Label Ignorant and First Label 
Knowledgeable conditions [χ2 (2, N=32) = 2.13, p = .34], and no differences between the 
Second Label Ignorant and Second Label Knowledgeable conditions [χ2 (2, N=32) = 
3.26, p = .20].   
A similar chi-square analysis on novel object choices found that participants in 
the Second Label Knowledgeable condition were more likely to select a novel distracter 
as the referent for the novel label than were participants in the Second Label Ignorant 
condition, [χ2 (2, N=32) = 5.96, p = .05]. No other comparisons reached significance with 
regard to novel distracter choices. No comparisons between conditions on the frequency 
of refusal to choose responses were significant. 
DISCUSSION 
Results from Study 1 indicate that by the age of 24 months, children are actively 
forming judgments about the credibility of unknown speakers and using these judgments 
to determine their willingness to learn novel labels from that source. During First Label 
conditions, children were willing to accept a novel label for a novel object regardless of 
the level of knowledge the speaker presented. During Second Label conditions, children 
were more willing to learn the novel label for a familiar object when the speaker 
expressed knowledge about other common objects than when the speaker expressed 
ignorance. These results support similar findings regarding second label learning with 
older children (3- to 4-year-olds) by Birch et al. (2008), and offer insight into 
understandings of ignorance at an age for which this ability has not previously been 
studied. Children actively evaluate the sources of information available to them and 
consider the credibility of the source when evaluating the accuracy of the novel 
information. 
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The results from the present study replicate findings by Krogh-Jespersen and 
Echols (2009) regarding children’s novel label learning from either an accurate or 
inaccurate speaker for either novel or familiar objects. In the Krogh-Jespersen and Echols 
study, 24-month-old children interacted with a speaker who was either accurate (e.g., 
presented a car and said, “That’s a car”) or inaccurate (e.g., presented a car and said, 
“That’s a duck”) during the Reliability Period. The Novel Label trials and test trials were 
identical in procedure to Study 1. Children were willing to learn a novel label for a novel 
object, regardless of the previous accuracy of the speaker. However, when the speaker 
was inaccurate, children were less willing to learn a novel label for a familiar object than 
when the speaker had been accurate. Children may be more willing to learn novel label 
information about novel objects when interacting with a single experimenter than when 
given a choice between two experimenters, regardless of familiarity with the object. 
When given a choice between two experimenters, children have the option of 
disregarding information provided by one of the sources. When interacting with a single 
experimenter, children have only their own limited knowledge about the novel object and 
the information provided by the experimenter to determine the label for the novel object. 
However, when children have information to rely upon, as in the case of Second Label 
conditions, they are more willing to learn from a reliable source than from an unreliable 
one. During second label learning, children have the option of relying on their previous 
knowledge about the label for the familiar object, and this may lead them to be more 
discriminating in their willingness to accept a novel label. 
There is a difference between the finding that children will learn a novel label for 
a novel object from both a knowledgeable and an ignorant speaker and the finding from 
Koenig and Harris’ (2005) study that children as young as 3 years attend to ignorance as 
a salient indictor of unreliability. As mentioned in the review, a possible confound in the 
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Koenig and Harris’ study is that children were given a decision as to whether to rely on a 
speaker who had provided accurate information (e.g., a speaker looked at a cup and said, 
“That’s a cup.”) and a speaker who was ignorant about the names of objects (e.g., a 
speaker looked at a cup and said, “I don’t know what that is.”) In this paradigm, children 
may choose to rely on the speaker who has provided a label as opposed to the ignorant 
speaker, who has not. In the study presented here, neither speaker provided labels for 
objects. Both speakers used phrasing that was closely matched in length and in word 
choice. Children could make their judgments about the speaker’s reliability based upon 
the phrases and the social cues provided, but were given no explicit information about the 
speaker’s accuracy with regard to labels for objects. During interactions with others, 
children may have to rely on more than just accuracy information to determine the 
credibility of a source of information. Upon encountering an unfamiliar adult, children 
may rely on social-pragmatic cues as to whether the adult is knowledgeable if the adult 
has not provided explicit labeling information. Children are taking into account 
referential cues from speakers that extend beyond the accuracy of the information being 
provided. 
Children’s incorrect answer choices when asked to indicate the referent for the 
novel label also presented interesting insight into their possible interpretations of the task. 
Children who answered incorrectly in the Second Label Ignorant and Second Label 
Knowledgeable conditions were more willing to indicate that a familiar distracter was the 
referent than were children in either the First Label Ignorant or First Label 
Knowledgeable conditions. Rather than learning that the novel label applied to the target 
object, it may be that these children assumed that the experimenter in the Second Label 
conditions was applying a nonsense word to any familiar object and, therefore, applied 
this rule to the test trials. Given that children did not show a similar pattern with regard to 
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incorrect novel distracter choices, it may be that children are attempting to create a 
strategy for interacting with the speaker that involves learning the rules for the game, 
such as the speaker calls familiar objects by funny names. It is not possible to determine 
children’s interpretations of the speaker’s behavior within the scope of this study, but it is 
clear that children are making judgments about the validity of the information provided 
by the speaker.  
Although it is not possible to determine children’s understanding of the ignorant 
labeler, there are at least two distinct interpretations that they could be entertaining. 
Children who interact with a speaker who portrays a lack of knowledge about familiar 
objects may infer that the speaker is familiar with the objects being presented but is 
unaware of the labels that apply to them. Another interpretation, which may account for 
children’s willingness to learn in the First Label conditions, is that the speaker is ignorant 
about objects typically familiar to the child, but is knowledgeable about novel objects that 
are unfamiliar to the child. It is unknown what characteristics or interpretations children 
are applying to the ignorant speaker, beyond the result that they are less willing to learn 
from him or her when they have preexisting knowledge about the objects.  
In Study 1, children were able to make judgments about a speaker’s knowledge 
based upon facial expression, tone of voice, and labeling phrases without the use of 
accurate or inaccurate labels. The purpose of Study 2 is to examine their ability to 
incorporate facial expression and tone of voice cues with explicit information about a 
speaker’s knowledge or lack thereof. To return to the example of an adult faced with 
various dinosaur genera, one possible outcome of being asked to provide the label for a 
dinosaur with a long neck and tail is to simply guess a possible name in such a way as to 
indicate the adult’s uncertainty in the label information being provided, such as: “I think 
that’s a brontosaurus.” The expression of confusion on the adult’s face, coupled with an 
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unsure voice, and explicit uncertainty in the phrase may indicate to the child that the 
information being provided is likely to be inaccurate. In the following study, children 
interacted with a speaker who provided either accurate or inaccurate information about 
familiar objects in a manner that expressed uncertainty about the information being 
offered. Following this uncertainty, the speaker presented two familiar objects and 
confidently labeled them with nonsense words, possibly contrasting the previous 
uncertainty that the speaker presented. Children’s willingness to apply the novel labels to 
the familiar objects was investigated. It is unknown how children as young as 24 months 
will respond to a speaker who provides accurate information, but does not express 
confidence in the information being provided. The labeling information being provided 
indicates the speaker is reliable; however, the social-pragmatic information reveals a lack 
of certainty that could influence children’s judgments of speaker knowledge.  Also of 
interest is whether children will regard an inaccurate labeler, who is uncertain about the 
information being provided, as an unreliable source of information given that the speaker 
is incorrect but may be aware that the information is unreliable. Children may interpret 
the uncertainty with inaccurate information as the adult’s way of indicating that the 
information he or she is provided is not correct; therefore, children are given the 
opportunity to mark this information as not being the most reliable for future use. . If 
children are attending to the accuracy of the speaker, they should be less willing to learn 
novel labels for familiar objects from an uncertain inaccurate speaker than from an 
uncertain accurate speaker. However, if children are attending to the confidence of the 
speaker as the most salient indication of reliability, it is possible that children will be 
unwilling to learn from either speaker, as both speakers present cues to their doubt in the 
information being provided. Finally, children may attend to the change in confidence that 
the speaker presents (e.g., the speaker who was previously doubtful about labeling 
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information is confident about the novel labels for familiar objects), which may increase 
their willingness to learn from either speaker.   
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Chapter 4: Study 2 
METHOD 
Participants 
Thirty-two children (16 males and 16 females) within the ages of 24-25 months 
(M = 24.28 months, range =23.90 to 24.93 months) participated in this study. The sample 
primarily was Caucasian and middle class (White-75%, Hispanic/Latino-16%, Asian 
American- 6%, Other-3%). According to parental report, none of the participants heard a 
language other than English more than 20% of their total language exposure. Participants 
were recruited from a database maintained at a university research lab. Each child 
participated individually in one thirty-minute experimental session and was given a small 
token of appreciation (e.g., a t-shirt) for participation. 
Materials and Design 
The design and procedure for this study was identical to the Second Label 
conditions described in Study 1 with the exception of the speaker’s labeling behavior 
during the reliability period. In this study, children interacted with an experimenter who 
presented a lack of confidence in the knowledge he or she had about familiar objects 
through facial expression, tone of voice, and with the following statements: “I think that’s 
a ____. What’s that? I think that’s a ______. What’s that? I think that’s a ________.”  
The experimenter provided either Accurate labels (e.g., presents a car and says, “I think 
that’s a car.”) or Inaccurate labels (e.g., presents a car and says, “I think that’s a banana.”) 
for the familiar objects being presented. During the Inaccurate Uncertain condition, the 
experimenter labeled the object with the name of a different familiar object also being 
used in the experiment (see Appendix B for scripts for each condition). Half of the 
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participants in the study participated in the Uncertain Accurate condition and half 
participated in the Uncertain Inaccurate condition, with equal numbers of males and 
females within each condition. Each object was referred to using 5 phrases, as in Study 1. 
The 2 Novel Label trials and 2 test trials were identical in presentation to the Second 
Label conditions in Study 1. Children’s willingness to accept novel labels (e.g., “gep” 
and “danu”) for familiar objects (e.g., the toy dog and ball) was examined. See Figure 3 
for a schematic of the procedure. 
Scoring 
For each trial, a correct choice, meaning the child chose the object that was 
labeled with the novel word, was given a score of one. If the child chose incorrectly, 
meaning the child chose either one of the two familiar objects or the novel object that had 
not been given a label, the child was given a score of zero. A “No Response” was coded 
as a zero as well. Responses were combined across the two test trials to yield a coding 
score of either zero correct, one correct, or two correct. 
RESULTS 
A chi-square analysis by condition revealed no significant differences in the 
frequency of children’s target object choices on zero, one, and two test trials, [χ2 (2, 
N=32) = 1.60, p = .45]. Table 2 shows the frequencies of children in each condition who 
responded by choosing an exemplar on zero, one, and two test trials for each of the 
following answer types: target object choices, familiar object choices, novel object 
choices, and refusals to choose.  Follow-up t-tests revealed that participants did not differ 
in their target object choices between the Uncertain Accurate condition (M= 1.06, SD=. 
68) and the Uncertain Inaccurate condition (M=. 88, SD= .81), t(30) = .71, p = .48. 
 63 
Tests against chance also were conducted as a measure of learning of novel labels. 
A chance level of .25 (1 in 4 objects) per trial was used to determine children’s likelihood 
of selecting the target object. Using a one-sample t-test, children’s target object choices 
in the Uncertain Accurate condition, t(15) = 3.31, p = .01, were greater than chance. 
Children in the Uncertain Inaccurate condition did not differ significantly from chance, t 
(15) = 1.86, p = .08.  
A chi–square analysis examining whether children selected the target object 
choice correctly on the 1st or the 2nd test trial (i.e., the number of children per condition 
that selected the target object correctly on the 1st trial compared with the number of 
children per condition that selected the target object correctly on the second trial) 
revealed no significant differences, [χ2 (1, N=32) = .04, p = .84]. These results suggest 
that children did not have difficulty retaining information about the target referent across 
trials and that the task did not tax their memory capabilities. 
Recall that in the test trials, children were presented with the target object, two 
previously labeled familiar distracters and a novel distracter that had not been given a 
label. A chi-square analysis was conducted in which children were grouped based on 
their scores (i.e., the number of children choosing 0, 1, or 2 familiar distracters across the 
2 test trials). There were no differences in familiar distracter choices between Uncertain 
Accurate and Uncertain Inaccurate conditions [χ2 (2, N=32) = 2.95, p = .23], as well as 
no differences between novel distracter choices [χ2 (2, N=32) = 1.65, p = .44] and no 
differences in refusal to choose answer types, [χ2 (2, N=32) = 2.29, p = .32].  
DISCUSSION 
This study provides insight into children’s understanding of both verbal and 
nonverbal social cues to a speaker’s reliability. Children who interacted with a speaker 
who provided accurate labels in an uncertain manner were willing to learn the novel 
 64 
labels for the familiar objects at above chance levels, whereas children performed at 
chance levels on the label learning trials after interacting with an uncertain inaccurate 
speaker. However, there were no significant differences between the Uncertain Accurate 
and Uncertain Inaccurate conditions in target object choice or types of errors. The 
speaker’s expression of doubt in the information being provided influenced children’s 
willingness to learn novel labels for familiar objects. This finding is different from the 
previous finding that 2-year-olds are less willing to learn second labels for familiar 
objects from inaccurate speakers than from accurate speakers (Krogh-Jespersen & 
Echols, 2009). However, differences in speaker reliability cues may account for the 
variation. Children in the Krogh-Jespersen and Echols (2009) study were presented with 
a reliability period similar to this study with the token difference being that the speaker 
labeled the familiar objects either accurately or inaccurately in a neutral tone and offered 
no other referential cues to the speaker’s knowledge. Therefore, children should have 
based their judgments of the speaker’s credibility on the accuracy of the information 
being provided. Children, in the present study, may not have based their judgments of the 
speaker’s reliability solely on whether the speaker provided accurate information, but, 
rather, they may have taken into account the speaker’s verbal phrasing, as well as gaze, 
tone of voice, body posture, and facial expression cues, when deciding whether to accept 
or reject the novel information being provided. These social cues may have overridden 
the accuracy information being presented. 
Also, recall that the speaker had a marked change in demeanor from uncertain 
during the reliability period to confident during the Novel Label trials. Children in the 
Uncertain Accurate condition may have been willing to accept a novel label for a familiar 
object given that the speaker, who had previously been unsure when providing the 
appropriate labels for familiar objects, was now certain in his or her knowledge of the 
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label that applied to the object. Children in the Uncertain Inaccurate condition may have 
already formed a judgment about the speaker as being unreliable, but, when faced with a 
shift in confidence, their willingness to learn may have increased slightly. The design of 
the present study does not allow this possibility to be examined, but it does support 
previous research findings (Jaswal & Malone, 2007; Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001) that 
children are attending to how confident a speaker appears when providing novel label 
information.  
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Chapter 5: Comparisons across Study 1 and Study 2 
RESULTS 
Further analyses were conducted to examine children’s willingness to learn across 
varying levels of reliability with regard to Second Label learning. A chi square analysis 
examining the frequency of children’s target object choices on zero, one, and two test 
trials across the 4 Second Label conditions (i.e., Knowledgeable, Ignorant, Uncertain 
Accurate, and Uncertain Inaccurate) revealed no significant difference, [χ2 (6, N=64) = 
8.46, p = .21]. Table 3 shows the frequencies of children in each condition who 
responded by choosing an exemplar on zero, one, and two test trials for each of the 
following answer types: target object choices, familiar object choices, novel object 
choices, and refusals to choose. 
Planned comparisons were conducted to examine children’s target object choices 
and patterns of error between conditions. An independent samples t-test revealed that 
children in the Uncertain Accurate condition were more likely to choose the target object 
than children in the Second Label Ignorant condition, t (30) = 2.07, p = .047.  Children in 
the Second Label Knowledgeable condition were equally willing to apply the novel label 
to the target object as children in the Uncertain Accurate condition, t (30) = .00, p = 1.00. 
There were also no significant differences in target object choice between Second Label 
Ignorant and Uncertain Inaccurate, t (30) = -1.05, p = .30, and between Second Label 
Knowledgeable and Uncertain Inaccurate, t (30) = -.76, p = .45 (see Figure 4 for a graph 
of means with standard errors across conditions). 
Children did not show a significant difference in novel distracter choice across 
conditions, [χ2 (6, N=64) = 11.69, p = .07]. However, there were significant differences 
in familiar distracter choice, [χ2 (6, N=64) = 13.18, p = .04], and refusals to choose, [χ2 
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(6, N=64) = 12.76, p = .047]. With regard to familiar distracter choice patterns, 44% of 
children in the Second Label Knowledgeable condition, 75% of children in the Second 
Label Ignorant condition, 13% of children in the Uncertain Accurate condition, and 38% 
of children in the Uncertain Inaccurate children chose the familiar distracter on 1 or more 
test trials. With regard to children’s refusal to choose an object during the test trials, 6% 
of children in the Second Label Knowledgeable condition, 19% of children in the Second 
Label Ignorant condition, 56% of children in the Uncertain Accurate condition, and 31% 
of children in the Uncertain Inaccurate condition refused to select an object on at least 1 
of the 2 test trials. See Table 3 for the frequency of children’s object choices by type of 





Chapter 6: General Discussion 
Referential intent cues may play an important role in early word learning by 
offering children additional information about the language environment. The results 
from Study 1 and Study 2 suggest that by 24 months, referential cues, such as the 
speaker’s prior reliability, may influence children’s willingness to apply a second label to 
a familiar object (i.e., override Mutual Exclusivity). Results from the First Label 
conditions show that children will learn a novel label for an unfamiliar object, regardless 
of the labeler’s level of knowledge. Results from the Second Label conditions suggest 
that children may have a sophisticated understanding of reliability that takes into account 
both verbal phrases and referential cues as indicators of the speaker’s level of knowledge 
or confidence.  
Children in the Uncertain Accurate condition interacted with a speaker who 
provided referential cues that, while not violating assumptions of reliability, also did not 
reinforce the expectation that adults are confident providers of accurate information. 
Children in this condition were equally likely to learn a second label for a familiar object 
as children who interacted with a confident speaker, who did not provide labels, in the 
Second Label Knowledgeable condition. This supports the expectation that children are 
willing to learn novel labels for familiar objects from speakers who provide some cues 
that indicate the information is reliable. Children in the Second Label Ignorant and 
Uncertain Inaccurate conditions learned novel labels at chance levels, meaning they were 
not successful at applying the novel labels to the familiar objects. When children 
encounter a speaker who does not indicate that he or she is a reliable source of 
information, children may be less willing to learn novel labels for familiar objects.  
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It is interesting to note that children appear not to take into account the reliability 
of the speaker when learning novel labels for novel objects (i.e., the First Label 
conditions). One possibility is that prior knowledge and referential intent influence 
children’s willingness to accept a novel label. The children in the First Label conditions 
did not already have a label that could be assigned to the object. These children might 
have accepted a novel name, even from a previously unreliable source, because they had 
no other options. Because children in the Second Label conditions had a name that could 
be used for the object, they could be more selective in who they accepted information 
from. If the novel label was provided by a previously reliable source, they may have been 
more likely to believe that the novel word was an alternate name for the object, 
particularly given that the labeler’s gaze and other social cues explicitly and consistently 
indicated that she or he was referring to the object in all conditions.  
Another possible interpretation of the results is that children may have difficulty 
retaining information that does not match their existing knowledge when a speaker is not 
providing reliable information. Because of the cognitive burden imposed by the 
unreliable labeler, children then have difficulty learning the novel label for the target 
object. This interpretation does not seem likely given that children had no difficulty 
learning the novel label for the novel object in the First Label conditions. In both the First 
Label and the Second Label conditions, children interacted with an experimenter who 
presented familiar objects and referred to them during the first 6 trials. The only 
difference between conditions was the familiarity of the objects that were associated with 
novel labels in the final 2 trials. Children in the First Label Ignorant condition did not 
differ in target object choice from the First Label Knowledgeable condition, meaning that 
even with the cognitive load imposed by an ignorant labeler, children were able to learn 
the novel label for a novel object. Also, results indicate no differences in target object 
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selection between test trial 1 and 2 in both studies, which might be expected if memory 
and processing demands were constraining performance. 
Aspects of the methodology, as previously addressed in the Discussion section of 
Study 1, also may have influenced the finding that 24-month-old children were willing to 
learn a novel label for a novel object regardless of the source of information in the First 
Label conditions. Previous studies (e.g., Koenig & Harris, 2005) have found that 4-year-
old children, and under some circumstances 3-year-old children, are more willing to learn 
a novel label for a novel object from a previously accurate speaker than from a previously 
inaccurate speaker. The Koenig and Harris procedure gives children another option in a 
first label learning context aside from accepting the inaccurate speaker’s label: they can 
accept a label from a previously accurate speaker. In contrast, in the current procedure 
children had no available label other than that provided by the ignorant speaker. In 
second label learning, children do have another option-their own label. Consequently, the 
differing results are compatible with the position that speaker reliability is most likely to 
have an effect when children have other information sources that they can use. Though 
not eliciting evidence of previous reliability on first label learning, the single labeler 
procedure may be more successful in eliciting speaker reliability effects in young 
children, at least in a second label learning context, because there is less information to 
track; younger children appeared to have difficulty retaining speaker reliability 
information in the two-speaker procedure (Koenig et al., 2004). 
Insight into children’s understanding of the task may be found when examining 
their error patterns. Across the Second Label conditions, children’s pattern of errors 
varied depending on the behavior of the speaker. Children in the Second Label conditions 
in Study 1, who interacted with either an ignorant or a knowledgeable speaker, were more 
likely to choose a familiar distracter as the referent for the novel label than children in 
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Study 2. In fact, over 75% of children in the Second Label Ignorant condition selected a 
familiar distracter on 1 or more test trials. Given that the objects were only referred to 
during the reliability period, and not explicitly labeled, it is possible that children in these 
conditions interpreted the task as one in which the speaker applies nonsense names to 
familiar objects. In contrast to the children in the Second Label conditions in Study 1, the 
children in Study 2, who interacted with an uncertain speaker, who provided labels 
during the Reliability Period, were more likely to refuse to choose any object as the 
referent for the novel label. Over half of the children in the Uncertain Accurate condition 
refused to select any object on at least 1 of the 2 test trials. This would indicate that they 
did not interpret the task as one of applying the novel label to a familiar object. One 
possible explanation is that they understood the nature of the task, but refused to interact 
with the experimenter who portrayed doubt while labeling objects that are commonly 
found in their environment. Children in the uncertain conditions had labeling information 
coupled with social cues to rely upon, while children in the knowledgeable and ignorant 
conditions did not have explicit labeling as an indicator of reliability. The combination of 
these cues may have caused more skepticism in their answer choices in the uncertain 
conditions. It is difficult to discern children’s interpretations of the speaker, but these 
error pattern differences suggest that children treat the speakers in Study 1 and Study 2, 
and therefore the tasks, differently.  
One important point to clarify is that these studies do not argue that children, by 
the age of 24 months, have a sophisticated understanding of the terms “think” and 
“know.” Both studies paired these mental state terms with highly salient social cues that 
supported the statements being provided by the speaker. The combined understanding of 
social cues and phrasing information may have allowed children to form judgments about 
reliability at an early age. 
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The research presented in Study 1 and Study 2 sheds light upon the three 
questions posited in the introduction to this paper. The first question addressed whether 
children attend to speaker reliability cues using similar processes as those used to 
understand referential cues. It is the argument of this paper that children at an early age 
are attending to both the social and the verbal information in their environment when 
determining the relevance and reliability of information. Children are using both verbal 
and nonverbal behavior to determine a speaker’s intentions when providing novel 
information. It could be that children expect a portion of the speaker’s intentions to be the 
desire to provide accurate information. Children may have the assumption, this “default 
trust,” that adults are accurate sources of information, which allows them early in 
language development to focus less on determining the reliability of individuals and 
attend more to the information being provided. When reliability cues are violated, 
whether by unreliable eye gaze behavior (Chow et al., 2008), inaccurate labeling (Birch 
et al. 2008; Jaswal & Malone, 2007; Koenig & Harris, 2005), or indications of ignorance 
(Koenig & Harris, 2005; Sabbagh et al., 2003), children must then adjust their behavior to 
account for this lack of credibility. In Chow et al.’s (2008) study, 14-month-old children 
were less willing to track the gaze of an unreliable looker. Children who are given the 
option to choose between a reliable and an unreliable speaker tend to rely on the speaker 
who provides accurate information (Koenig & Harris, 2005). Taken together, children 
from a young age are using information available in their environment, whether they are 
preverbal infants who rely on eye gaze or verbal children who attend to the accuracy of 
labels, to determine the reliability of the source of the information being presented.  
The second question addressed in this dissertation focuses more specifically on 
the cues to the mental state of the speaker, which extends to more than just attending to 
the accuracy of the speaker’s information. The present studies examined children’s early 
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understanding that adults provide information about the extent of their knowledge 
through both explicit phrasing, as in “I don’t know what that is,” and social pragmatic 
information, such as tone of voice and facial expression. Young 2-year-old children were 
less willing to learn novel labels for familiar objects from a speaker who was previously 
ignorant about familiar objects than when the speaker was knowledgeable. Children were 
even willing to learn novel labels for familiar objects from a speaker who was doubtful 
about the accurate information being provided. However, when the speaker was doubtful 
and provided inaccurate information, children were more likely to reject the novel label 
being applied to the familiar object. The task presented here did not require children to 
form an in-depth understanding of the speaker’s intentions, as in the Theory of Mind 
tasks with older children that typically ask children to predict the future behavior of 
others. In this task, children simply had to either accept or reject the novel information 
being presented, which may have allowed children to create superficial judgments about 
the credibility of the speaker. It is unknown whether children would generalize their 
judgments about the speaker’s reliability across domains or even different speakers, but 
this would be an interesting area for future research.  
The third question was the focus of much of the discussion presented in this 
paper. Children may rely on accurate and inaccurate labelers when they have no 
preexisting knowledge to contradict the information being presented. When they have 
previous knowledge, as in the case of second label learning, they may be more likely to 
weigh the risk of learning novel information from an unreliable source as detrimental to 
their current knowledge state. Instead, children may maintain the information that they 
currently hold and disregard new information provided by a source that does not appear 
credible. However, when the source of information complies with their general 
assumptions about reliable speakers, children may be more willing to update their current 
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knowledge to include the novel information. This argument is supported by Bergstrom et 
al.’s (2006) proposal that children evaluate information being provided by others to 
determine if it coincides with their previous knowledge. If the information is consistent 
with the children’s current knowledge, then they easily incorporate it, but if the 
information contradicts their present knowledge, children must rely on factors, such as 
the reliability of the speaker, to determine the validity of the new information.  
When young children experience an ambiguous labeling situation, such as a novel 
label being applied to a familiar object, they may rely on the referential cues of the 
speaker to clarify the referent of the label.  When speaker reliability cues support the 
expectation that an adult provides accurate labels for objects, children are more willing to 
accept the label provided. However, when speaker reliability cues violate the social 
expectation that children have about adult labeling behavior, children may choose to rely 
on principles, such as Mutual Exclusivity, to infer appropriate labels.  Referential intent 
cues, including the prior reliability of the speaker, could serve as a guide for children in 
understanding when to adhere to and when to override word-learning principles such as 
Mutual Exclusivity.  
Previous research in language development has focused on the ability to 
determine the proper referent for a label from an infinite number of possibilities. 
However, language learners are not overwhelmed by this task; in fact, the ability to map 
labels onto objects appears almost effortless, even for young children. This ease of 
learning may result in part from the wealth of information that is available for identifying 
the appropriate label for an object. Speakers provide cues to their intentions in the form 
of both verbal and nonverbal behaviors that lead both the speaker and the listener to 
understand the goal of the interaction. The ability to interpret these contextual cues can 
aid in early learning of object labels. The present studies further investigated children’s 
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understanding of contextual cues available from the speaker, such as reliability and 
mental state knowledge, which may aid children in either identifying the appropriate 
label for an object that is unfamiliar to them or understanding that a familiar object has 
multiple labels. These studies also focused on a younger age group than most current 
speaker reliability studies, using a method that reduces that amount of information 
children have to attend to during the task. This allows for conclusions to be made about 
the development of children’s understanding of mental state cues during early word 
learning.  
Children rely on others to provide information about their environment, but this 
does not just include linguistic information. They learn facts about the world, such as that 
the Earth is a planet, as well as abstract concepts, such as justice and moral values, that 
are not easily proven through their own experiences. Children will also have to navigate 
the often times hurtful realization that sometimes people provide inaccurate information 
for selfish purposes. Children rely on others to support and guide them as they gain a 
better understanding of themselves and their own knowledge. It is with this 
understanding that they become accurate sources of information as well. 
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Table 1.  
Frequency of children who chose exemplars on zero, one, or two test trials in the 
following categories: the target object (correct choice), a familiar distracter of the two 
that were present during test trials, or a novel object distracter that had not been given a 
label in Study 1. Within each category type, each participant’s (of the 16 participants 











   First Label Knowledgeable  
Number of 
items chosen     
0 3 15 11 11 
1 9 1 5 3 
2 4 0 0 2 
   First Label Ignorant  
Number of 
items chosen     
0 5 12 14 11 
1 3 4 2 3 
2 8 0 0 2 
   Second Label Knowledgeable  
Number of 
items chosen     
0 2 9 10 15 
1 11 6 6 1 
2 3 1 0 0 
   Second Label Ignorant  
Number of 
items chosen     
0 6 4 13 13 
1 10 10 1 3 




Table 2.  
Frequency of children who chose exemplars on zero, one or two test trials in the 
following categories: the target object (correct choice), a familiar distracter of the two 
that were present during test trials, or a novel object distracter that had not been given a 
label in Study 2. Within each category type, each participant’s (of the 16 participants 












   Uncertain Accurate  
Number of 
items chosen     
0 3 14 14 7 
1 9 2 2 6 
2 4 0 0 3 
   Uncertain Inaccurate  
Number of 
items chosen     
0 6 10 11 11 
1 6 5 5 4 
2 4 1 0 1 
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Table 3.  
Frequency of children who chose exemplars on zero, one, or two test trials in the 
following categories: the target object (correct choice), a familiar distracter of the two 
that were present during test trials, or a novel object distracter that had not been given a 
label in the Second Label conditions of Study1 and both conditions of Study 2. Within 
each category type, each participant’s (of the 16 participants within each condition) 












   Second Label Knowledgeable  
Number of 
items chosen     
0 2 9 10 15 
1 11 6 6 1 
2 3 1 0 0 
   Second Label Ignorant  
Number of 
items chosen     
0 6 4 13 13 
1 10 10 1 3 
2 0 2 2 0 
   Uncertain Accurate  
Number of 
items chosen     
0 3 14 14 7 
1 9 2 2 6 
2 4 0 0 3 
   Uncertain Inaccurate  
Number of 
items chosen     
0 6 10 11 11 
1 6 5 5 4 
2 4 1 0 1 
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Figure 1.  
 
A schematic of the procedure for Study 1, including sample reliability period objects, as 
well as Novel Label trials and 1 sample test trial for both First and Second Label 
conditions.  
Reliability Period (6 Trials): 
Knowledgeable Labeling  Ignorant Labeling 
 
Trial 1… I know what that is.   I don’t know what that is. 
  What’s that?    What’s that? 
 
Trial 6  I know what that is.   I don’t know what that is. 
  What’s that?    What’s that? 
Novel Label Trials (2 Trials): 
  First Label Conditions  Second Label Conditions 
Trial 1: That’s a gep    That’s a gep 
 
Trial 2: That’s a danu    That’s a danu 
 
Test Trial (2 Trials): 
First Label Conditions (1 of 2 Trials): Where’s a gep? Can you point to a gep? 
 
Target  Familiar Distracter  Familiar Distracter Novel Distracter 
 
Second Label Conditions (1 of 2 Trials): Where’s a gep? Can you point to a gep? 
 
Target  Familiar Distracter  Familiar Distracter Novel Distracter  
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Figure 2.  
 





A schematic of the procedure for Study 2, including sample reliability period objects, as 
well as Novel Label trials and 1 sample test trial.  
 
Reliability Period (6 Trials): 
 Uncertain Accurate Labeling  Uncertain Inaccurate Labeling 
 
Trial 1… I think that’s a duck.   I think that’s a car. 
  What’s that?    What’s that? 
 
Trial 6  I think that’s a car.   I think that’s a duck. 
  What’s that?    What’s that? 
 
 Novel Label Trials (2 Trials):   
Trial 1: That’s a gep     
 
Trial 2: That’s a danu     
 
Test Trial-(2 Trials): 
Test Trial (1 of 2): Where’s a gep? Can you point to a gep? 
 




Figure 4.  
  
Means and standard errors for each of the Second Label conditions across Study 1 and 





Please indicate your child's comprehension of each of the following words by checking 
the appropriate box.  If your family uses and alternate word to indicate an object 
(e.g. "kitty" for "cat") write that word in the space provided  
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KNOWLEDGABLE LABELING-NOVEL OBJECT 
SCRIPT: CONDITION 1/CB2 
 
1. I know what that is. What’s that? I know what that is. What’s that? I know what 
that is.  
 
2. I know what that is. What’s that? I know what that is. What’s that? I know what 
that is. 
 
3. I know what that is. What’s that? I know what that is. What’s that? I know what 
that is. 
 
4. I know what that is. What’s that? I know what that is. What’s that? I know what 
that is. 
 
5. I know what that is. What’s that? I know what that is. What’s that? I know what 
that is. 
 
6. I know what that is. What’s that? I know what that is. What’s that? I know what 
that is. 
 
7. That’s a danu  (top) 
 
8. That’s a gep  (bird) 
 
TEST ORDER: 
Where’s a danu? Can you point to a danu? 
 
1. top                       .   bell      
 
Where’s a gep? Can you point to a gep? 
 
2.                  . fluff                    .  bird 
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IGNORANT LABELING-NOVEL OBJECT 
SCRIPT: CONDITION 2/ CB1 
1. I don’t know what that is. What’s that? I don’t know what that is. What’s that? I 
don’t know what that is.  
 
2. I don’t know what that is. What’s that? I don’t know what that is. What’s that? I 
don’t know what that is. 
 
3. I don’t know what that is. What’s that? I don’t know what that is. What’s that? I 
don’t know what that is. 
 
4. I don’t know what that is. What’s that? I don’t know what that is. What’s that? I 
don’t know what that is. 
 
5. I don’t know what that is. What’s that? I don’t know what that is. What’s that? I 
don’t know what that is. 
 
6. I don’t know what that is. What’s that? I don’t know what that is. What’s that? I 
don’t know what that is. 
 
7. That’s a gep  (bell) 
 
8. That’s a danu  (fluff) 
 
TEST ORDER: 
Where’s a gep? Can you point to a gep? 
 
1.                      .   bell                       .   top 
 
Where’s a danu? Can you point to a danu? 
 
2. bird                     . fluff                    . 
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KNOWLEDGABLE LABELING-FAMILIAR OBJECT 
CONDITION 2/ CB2 
 
1. I know what that is. What’s that? I know what that is. What’s that? I know what 
that is.  
 
2. I know what that is. What’s that? I know what that is. What’s that? I know what 
that is. 
 
3. I know what that is. What’s that? I know what that is. What’s that? I know what 
that is. 
 
4. I know what that is. What’s that? I know what that is. What’s that? I know what 
that is. 
 
5. I know what that is. What’s that? I know what that is. What’s that? I know what 
that is. 
 
6. I know what that is. What’s that? I know what that is. What’s that? I know what 
that is. 
 
7. That’s a danu  (dog) 
 




Where’s a danu? Can you point to a danu? 
 
1. dog                       .   fluff      
 
Where’s a gep? Can you point to a gep? 
 
2.                  . bird                   .  ball 
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IGNORANT LABELING-FAMILIAR OBJECT 
SCRIPT: CONDITION 1/ CB2 
 
1. I don’t know what that is. What’s that? I don’t know what that is. What’s that? I 
don’t know what that is.  
 
2. I don’t know what that is. What’s that? I don’t know what that is. What’s that? I 
don’t know what that is. 
 
3. I don’t know what that is. What’s that? I don’t know what that is. What’s that? I 
don’t know what that is. 
 
4. I don’t know what that is. What’s that? I don’t know what that is. What’s that? I 
don’t know what that is. 
 
5. I don’t know what that is. What’s that? I don’t know what that is. What’s that? I 
don’t know what that is. 
 
6. I don’t know what that is. What’s that? I don’t know what that is. What’s that? I 
don’t know what that is. 
 
7. That’s a danu  (ball) 
 




Where’s a danu? Can you point to a danu? 
 
1. ball                       .   bell      
 
Where’s a gep? Can you point to a gep? 
 




CONDITION 2/ CB1 
 
1. I think that’s a _______. What’s that? I think that’s a _______. What’s that? I 
think that’s a _______.  
 
2. I think that’s a _______. What’s that? I think that’s a _______. What’s that? I 
think that’s a _______. 
 
3. I think that’s a _______. What’s that? I think that’s a _______. What’s that? I 
think that’s a _______. 
 
4. I think that’s a _______. What’s that? I think that’s a _______. What’s that? I 
think that’s a _______. 
 
5. I think that’s a _______. What’s that? I think that’s a _______. What’s that? I 
think that’s a _______. 
 
6. I think that’s a _______. What’s that? I think that’s a _______. What’s that? I 
think that’s a _______. 
 
7. That’s a gep  (ball) 
 
8. That’s a danu  (dog) 
 
TEST ORDER: 
Where’s a gep? Can you point to a gep? 
 
1.                      .   ball                       .   bird 
 
Where’s a danu? Can you point to a danu? 
 









CONDITION 2/ CB1 
 
1. I think that’s a _______. What’s that? I think that’s a _______. What’s that? I 
think that’s a _______.  
 
2. I think that’s a _______. What’s that? I think that’s a _______. What’s that? I 
think that’s a _______. 
 
3. I think that’s a _______. What’s that? I think that’s a _______. What’s that? I 
think that’s a _______. 
 
4. I think that’s a _______. What’s that? I think that’s a _______. What’s that? I 
think that’s a _______. 
 
5. I think that’s a _______. What’s that? I think that’s a _______. What’s that? I 
think that’s a _______. 
 
6. I think that’s a _______. What’s that? I think that’s a _______. What’s that? I 
think that’s a _______. 
 
7. That’s a gep  (ball) 
 
8. That’s a danu  (dog) 
 
TEST ORDER: 
Where’s a gep? Can you point to a gep? 
 
1.                      .   ball                       .   bird 
 
Where’s a danu? Can you point to a danu? 
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